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This thesis argues tbat, under certain conditions, economic liberalization can strengthen 
the plitical position of consewative coalitions in transitional democracies. A large body of 
titerature on the effect of market-opening reforms and democratization posits that economic 
libedization, by generating social change, cceates new opportunicies for political refonn. This 
viewpoint, while not unchallenged, appears to be predorninant within academic circles. Through 
an empirical analysis of two case studies, Taiwan and South Korea, this study contributes a new 
perspective to the debate over the political effect of economic liberalization. The luialysis of 
these two countries focuses especially on the impact of market-opening refonn on the electoral- 
ideological area of pditical lik, an area (termed "political space" by this thesis) to which most 
existing literaîure seerns to attach only secondary importance (as it focuses ptimarily on 
institutional dynamics). 
Taiwan began its democratization process in 1987 with the lifting of marumarual Iaw, while 
the f i t  rneasures to liberalize the island's economy were implernented in the 1980s. However, 
as economic and institutional cefonn progressed throughout the 1990s. conservative political 
elements (represented rnainly by the Kuominrang) have managed to mniatain their dominance 
over Taiwan's political space. A simiiar development can be observed in South Korea, w here in 
spite of growing economic de-regulation and the financial crash of 1997 (tfirough which 
additional neo-liberal refonns have been imposed on South Korea's economy) conservative 
politicians and parties appear to have retained their dominance over this country's political space. 
As in Taiwan, the liberalization of politicai institutions and the efonomy since 1987 (when 
authoritarian tule in South Korea ended) have not brought about the triumph of pro-refom 
political forces. This thesis concludes by outlining some theoreticai tessons exttacted from the 
case studies that nùght translaie into useful generalizations on the political effect of economk 
libetalization. 
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A NOTE ON CB[NESE AND KOREAN NAMES 
Most Chinese and Korean names that appear in this thesis are written with the family name fmt. 
However, certain names are given in a different order to reflect common usage in the literature or 
the media (e.g., Syngman Rhee or James Soong). 
CBAPTER ONE: CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
1.1. 
Does economic liberalization always pave the way for plitical refonn? How does a 
liberalizing foreign economic policy affect the domestic "political space" of transitional democracies? 
1s it true that in such dernomcies, liberalizing policies help increase the political space available to 
refomst political groups? How is the political space available to conservative' forces affected by 
liberaiizing foceign economic policies? In sum, under what conditions are political groups in 
demacratizing countries able to use the effects of economic tiberalization to inctiease their own 
political space? 
Many authors in the subfield of international political economy (e.g., Goldstein 1989; 
Haggard 1988; Hall 1989; Kienle 1998; Milner and Keohane 1996; Morales 1997) have asserted that 
growing economic liberalization, because it often brings sudden sociwconomic change, can increase 
the political space available to reforrnisr forces within a community, leading to the decline of 
conservative forces. This view has becn summarized by Larry Diamond in an article on 
democratization in Laiin Amerka: "By pmmoting the rapid growth of tnde, greater economic 
competitiveness, and fiter flows of capital and information, free (rade agreements are undennining 
sociaiiy regressive vested interests . . . and stimulating economic growth and M e r  economic 
liberaüzacioo. These factors press in the direction of greater political openness and competitiveness 
as weli" (1997: 40). Specifically addressing the possible effects of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) on the Mexican politicai system, Peter Smith has written that '"Free trade and 
economic liberalization could loosen the social moorings of the present politicai system in Mexico 
and, thus, create objective conditions for a far-reaching political transition" (1992: 19). 
-- 
' This work defines the tenn "consemtiven in a betunw~mf, not idrologicaf, way. Classifieci as conservathe 
are those politicai parties or leaders primarily identined with support for the status quo and opposition t cirastic 
reform of theu societies. According to ihis dennition, M&t authoritarïan leaders opposed to poiiticat change 
can be cailed conservative. Cbapters Two and Tbree wilî discuss th specific policy positions of Taiwancse and 
South Korean conservatives. 
S o m  specialists on Taiwan md South Korea echo this general view. For example, Yun-han 
Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-in Moon have argued that just as global economic Iiberalism contnbuted to 
the collapse of Eunipean Communism, it has also helped dismantle the "developmental state" and 
"dcvelopmentalist coalition" of authontarian regimes in Taiwan and ~orea,' weakening state leverage 
over the pnvate sector and civil society (1997: 272-273). Samantha Ravich (1999) has also wcitten 
that by increasing the importance of civil society relative to the state, economic liberalization played a 
key role in Korea's transition to democracy. She maintains that marketsriented refonn broadened 
the country's political space, which in tum forced the authoritarian regime into accepting democratic 
reforms in 1987 (Ravich 2000.64). 
1 argue that the prevalent view on the relationship between economic liberalization and 
politicai refonn, despite its rich insights, remains inadequate. Through the empirical analysis of two 
case studies, Taiwan and South Korea, the present thesis will offer a different interpretation of this 
relationship, which is central to the study of transitional democracies. The questions addressed at the 
outset of this thesis are prompted mainly by empirical observation. The two case studies analyzed, 
Taiwan and South Korea, have undergone economic reforms that have indeed been accompanied by 
political-institutionai reforms (Le., democratization). However, these refocms have not been 
accompanied, in my view, by a fundamental ceaügnment of dornestic political forces (i.e., the power 
balance between conservatives and reformists) in either country. 
Undoubtedly, as scholars such as Helen Milner and Robert Keohane (1996) predict, liberal 
foceign economic policies often represent a clear break with the past and can have a significant 
impact on the dornestic political landscape by providing new oppominities to refomiers. la some 
cases, refonnist political elements have been able to take advantage of change and increase the 
political space available to them. However, in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea economic 
liberalization has helped conservative politicai elements preserve theu political space. Moreover, 
conseNatives bave been politicaiiy successfui through persuasive, not coercive, means (as opposed 
In this Ihesis, I refer to the Repubiic of Korea indistinctly as "South Kocea" or "Korea" 
to, for example, Singapore and Malaysia, where niling parties arguably still employ a measure of 
coercion to retain power). The loss of coercive power does not necessariiy imply the loss of political 
strength. As Gregory Noble (1999: 154) points out in regards to the fiomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, 
conservative authoritarian coalitions can successiully metamorphose from a coercive institution into a 
political party that effectively cornpetes for votes. Thus, Milner and Keohane's hypothesis applies to 
the cases of Taiwan and Swth Korea only partially - up to the point of political-institutional reforms. 
It does not fit with a more fundamental type of political reform, that is, the reform of political space. 
in this sense, the cases of Taiwan and South Korea question the validity of Milner and Keohane's 
hypothesis, and thus are worth close examination. 
Political developments in both Taiwan and South Korea cd1 into question the prevalent view 
about the transfonnational effect of econornic liberalization on the domestic politics of authoritarian 
States. However, each case does this under somewhat different conditions. in the case of Taiwan, 
econornic liberalization, while clearly bringing change, has not brought sociai trauma. In the case of 
South Korea, market-opening masures did apparently conaibute to economic and social trauma d e r  
1987 (especially during the 1997-1998 financial cnsis). In both countries, though, the "state of flux*' 
created by economic and financial libecaiization has not enabled reforrnist groups to decisively 
expand their political space. in fact, conservative forces in the two countries have often been able to 
take advantage of the political vacuum lefî by change in order to preserve or increase theu own 
political space. This developmnt has taken place within two highly cornpetitive (not "closed" or 
"semicornpetitive") popoiitical ad electotal systems. 
In sum, this study will develop the foilowing hypothesis, using the cases of Taiwan and South 
Korea: market-apening memures, rather than creating the political space necessary for political 
entrepreneurs to fundamentally reofganifganize domestic politics (to use Helen Milner and Robert 
Keohane's expression) in traositional democracies, can actualIy help safeguard the political space 
available to conservative politicai elements. Those masures can sometimes persuade the public to 
pmvide support to conseniative elements that had previously exercised coercion to control the 
population. In addition, this thesis aiso argues tbat it is pertinent to distinguish between political- 
institutional and political-spatial change when examining the effects of economic change. It may be 
easier for intemationaiization to bring about political-institutionai change (e.g., transforming 
authontacian institutions into democratic ones) than to bring about political-spatial change (e.g., 
realigning the ideologicai preferences of individual voters and social groups, usually expressed in the 
form of electoral results). Even if economic liberaiizatioii helps pave the way for political- 
institutional refonn, it may actudy reinforce political-spatial conservatism at the sarne time, which 
was the case in both Taiwan and South Korea 
The issues tackled by this thesis are relevant for four principal reasons. Fust, they relate to 
the larger issue of how foreign economic policy can affect domestic politics (which is related to the 
"second image reversed" concept formulateci by Peter Gourevitch in 1978). Second, they address the 
issue of refonnist-conservative political interaction in transitional democracies. Third, the questions 
addressed by this thesis are relevant to the study of voting patterns and the behaviour of any electonte 
in the face of economic change. F i l y ,  1 believe this thesis sheds some light on the generai politicai 
behaviour of the middle classes. My conclusions appeiir to support the assertion that the middle class 
in any Society is, in political t e m ,  an essentially consemative force. 
International economic forces uicreasingly define the interests of domestic political coalitions 
(Miilnec and Keohane 1996: 16). As Peter Gourevitch has wntten, "something can be learned about 
the importance of power in shaping policy" (Gourevitch 1986: 20); this thesis is based on the premise 
that something can be learned about the importance of policy in detecmining who wields domestic 
political power. We cannot understand domestic politics "without comprehendig the nature of the 
linkages between national economies and the world economy" (Milner and Keohane 1996: 3). 
1.2. G~DS in the Current Wteraturq 
This thesis attempts to systematicaiiy study the politicai-spath1 dynamics that foiiow political- 
institutional change. These dynamics have been overimked by the position represented by Mllner 
and Keohane (1996). This b h d  spot is shared by both theoreticai literature and regional studies 
literature on the political economy of democratization. First, there seems to be a consensus wiîhin 
current iiterature on democratization on the positive correlation between economic modemization and 
democratization (Geddes 1999: 119). This position has wide support in the academic comrnunity, 
and Milner and Keohane's hypothesis on economic überalization and politicai change is one version 
of this consensus. Evidence also seems to suggest that the likeiihood of reversion to authoritarianism 
increases when economic development slackens (Geddes 1999: 140). As Samuel Huntington posited 
in The Third Wave (1991), economic development creates new sources of power that the state cannot 
control. Economic growth can achieve this by expandiig the miMe class, rendering civil society 
more complex, and opening-up society to new influences (Huntington 1991: 65-67). During the 
"third wave" of d e m o c ~ o n ,  political parties associated with authoritarian regimes did very 
poorly in free elections (Huntington 1991: 175): A "minority" view does exist, which implies that 
economic change cm actually aid conservative political elernents in some ways. Hector Schamis 
(1999) has written that ment economic reforms in Latin America often preserve "market resewes" 
for govemment dies? in Pathwaysfiom the Penphery Stephan Haggard States Chat in the East Asian 
NICS "new democratic pressures were largely offset by fundamental political and institutional 
continuities . . . " (Haggard 1995: 128): Either camp, however, does not ded specificaüy with the 
political-sputial effect of economic liberalization on transitional democracies! 
Skphan Haggivd and Robert Kaufman (1997) have offered insightful nuances on ihe political economy of 
dernomtic transitions. In theiu view, authoritarian nilets c m  reîmt h m  a position of strcngth when economic 
performance is smng and ihus establish an institutional framework that will help kir political allies under 
dernomtic niles (Haggard and Kau- 1997: 267). 
In the context of North Aoiecica, one version of this minority view can be found in Diane Davis' (1995) 
argument that the Mexican and US govemments hoped the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
would boister their respective political bases in Norihem Mexico and the Southem parts of the US, respectively. 
Literature tbat deals with political transitions in general has not yet arcived at a wmprehensive explanation of 
democratic change. "It seems as though there should be a parsimonious and compeliiig explanation of the 
transitions, but the expIaoations proposeci thus far have been coafusingly complicated, careless about basic 
methodological details, ofîen more usefui as descriptions than explanation, and surprisïngly inconsistent with 
each othet" (Goddes 1999: 117). 
Nat dl authors, of course. can be aiiocated to either camp. Nevertheless, ignorance of ihe political-spatial 
effats of economic iiberalization seems prevaleat. For exampls Adam Rzeworski's approach (1991) is 
maïniy coacemed witb the politid-institutional effects of marketqening refonn in msitional dernomcies- 
Meanwhile, there is a large body of English-language literature that deals with Taiwmese and 
South Korean democratization and the role economic development played in political change. 
However, very few studies focus specificaiiy on economic liberaiization (not general economic 
development) as the independent variable, and domestic political space (from an electoral-ideological, 
not institutional, perspective) as the dependent variable. It seems that works on South Korea deal 
more extensively with economic liberalization as an independent variable, whereas studies of Taiwan 
place more emphasis on ethnic cleavages and national security issues as independent variables. 
Moreover, while some obsewers have written about the generai political effects of economic 
intemationaiization on Taiwan and South Korea, few have systematicaily analyzed these effects on 
politicai space itself. For example, Tong Whan Park stated in his 1998 article that economic 
liberalization in South Korea would sever the link between big business (represented by the chaebo[) 
and the govemment. On the other hand, Karl Fields (1995: 246) has predicted chat further ecomimic 
liberalization will result in a strengthening of business groups in the two countries, which rnay well 
result in a strengthening of conservative coalitions between business and the state. in spite of their 
differing conclusions, Both Park and Fields share an exclusively institutionai focus. 
The above mentioned literatures thus seem to have left a "gap" in the analysis of the politicai 
effect of economic liberalization by not paying sufficient attention to the domestic political space of 
transitional democracies. in fact, cumnt literature does not draw a clear distinction between 
political-spatial change and institutionai change. This thesis attempts to fi11 that "gap" by drawing 
some plausible generalizations h m  the analysis of Taiwan and South Korea's experience. Let us 
now clarify our two key concepts, political space and economic liberalization. 
13. PoHdcal S m  
Different scholars use the term "political space" in a variety of ways. S o m  use it to define 
the actuai geographic reach of certain political practices or juridictions; others use it to deüneate the 
level of politicai k d o m  available to ce- social groups. Still others use the term to define power 
relations between different entities. Ana Grabam and Joanna Regulska (1997)' and Geeta Somjee 
(1999) define the political space available to wornen as the arnount of leverage women are able to 
exercise on the political processes in their communities (in Poland and india). On the other hand, 
Ralph HeintPnan (1994) and 7ïre E c o n ~ ~ s r  (2000) attach a value-related meaning to the tem; they 
see political space as a geographical am whece communities share sirnilar values and pursue a 
common political project (in Canada or Europe). Anthony Jarvis and Albert Paolini (1995) give both 
spatial and imaginary ("reflexiw claims to identity and subjectivity") qualities to the tenn "political 
space." In their view, "[mudernity] is built on îhe state form as a way of organizing and defining 
political space" (Jarvis and Paolini 1995: 3-4). In the context of delineating political jurisdictions 
over local communities, the term political space has mainly spatial maning for William Lyons and 
David Lowery (1986). On the other hand, Warren Magnusson (1996) criticizes the lack of political 
space in today's world when ordinary citizens are not able to participate in the politicd pmcess (he 
proposes the municipality as an area where political space is still available to common people for 
action). Fernando Erez Coma (1997) used the term espacio polirico (political space) to define the 
In spite of the differences between these inte~retations of political space, one h d s  ihat the 
various meanings attached to this term shace some common aspects. Most authors who use the 
concept of political space imply that politicai space is a field of action, whether geographic or 
abstract. Smggie for political freedom of action takes place on this field. Political Freedom of action 
is gained eiiher by gaining power at the expense of others or by expandimg the field of action itself, 
In tbeoty, the concept of political space is a dynamic one because the size of political space can 
expand or contract, for example, by the extension of suffrage rigbts or the annexation of new 
territones, Fially, the concept of politicai space is a dynamic one because wiihin a given space there 
is a constant ebb and flow of political forces, as certain forces expand theu portion of the poüacal 
' According to theSc two authors, "@]oliticai sprice is intluenced strongiy by political culture," In the case of 
Poland, womenys political space bas been limitai because men have generally shaped potitical culture (1997: 
66). 
space at the expense of others. 
For the purposes of ihis thesis, 1 detïne political space as an abstract entity that is composed 
of two fields in political life over which control is necessary in order to increase one's political 
leverage: electoral competition and the competition to shape the paradigms of public debate. 1 
conceive politicai space within any society as afinite cotnmodity. Control of the domestic political 
space can translate into the aitainment of policy objectives by providing politicai parties with 
increased political leverage. Although conflict over political space can take place through arrned 
force or peaceful means, this thesis wiU limit itself to the analysis of peaceful stcuggie over politicai 
space. Conflict over political space is a "zero-sum" game: political support means depriving 
a rival group of such support, since the "arnount" of political support available at any specfic point in 
rime is limited? 
In democratizing societies, there are two types of stniggles over politicai space: the electoral- 
political stcuggle and the ideoiogical-political stniggle between organized political groups competing 
amongst themselves for suprerne politicai power. M i l e  1 define "politicai" in a n m w ,  electoral and 
ideological sense, the business of identifying the political spaces within these two areas is quite 
complex. Thus, 1 sirnply use the tenn "political space" to define key areas of the domestic arena of 
political competition. Groups that increase their control over one or both of the areas can be said to 
gain politicai space, while those who lose momentum in the stcuggle for control over those areas lose 
political space within society. 1 s h d  proceed to comment on the two politicai areas, elections and 
ideologicai dominance, which compose the concept of political space. 
Electoral-political stniggies between organized politicai groups are a key component of the 
political space within a dernocratizing polity. These struggles determine which groups wiU acquire 
control over the different branches and levels of domestic govemment. On one haad, these struggies 
are zero-sum garnes because the number of elected executive or legislacive positions available to 
As discussed below. political space can expand or contract over a period oftime, genediy as a result of 
institutional change. 
competing candidates at any single point in t h  is finite, On the other hand, the public arena in 
which electoral stniggle takes place can grow or shrink as different sectors of the population enter the 
domestic poiitical equation and gain a voice in the arena (a voice that may have previously been 
stifled). The electorai-political arena is coaiposed not only of the race to gain voter support in 
election tirne, but also of the shifts, alliances, and defections that take place between and within 
political organizations for electoral pwposes. While a politicai pacty may gain political space by 
increasing its share of votes in a national election, it rnay also increase its share of political space right 
before an election by allying with another political force and increasing its electorai appeal this way. 
Ideologicai-political stmggle W e e n  politicai groups within society is the second key 
component of politicai space. These sttuggfes determine which political groups are to acquire 
ascendancy over public opinion in democratizing polities hnveen eiectoral carnpaigns. While it is 
easy to quantify the electoral success of ii politicai group, it is much more difficult to quantify, 
between elections, the level of ideological ascendancy a political party exercises over the public 
discourse. Some possible indicators are the level of parties' presence in government institutions 
(detennined, for instance, by the number of seats they control in the national legislature), public 
opinion polls, media reports, the level of social harmony, industrial relations, and govemment policy. 
Carrying ideological momentum in the arena of public opinion when in cornpetition with rivals is 
essential to the strength of political groups in democratizing polities. Not only can the sway of public 
opinion influence govemment policy, but also the i&ological sttength of political groups can spi11 
over into election time and translate into concrete political gains. The =na of ideologicai-political 
stmggle can grow if new currents of thought are added to the political debate. On the other hand, as 
in the electoral arena, ideological stniggle is a zero-sum game at a particular point in time. By 
gaining ideological rnomenhim, a political party necessarily puts its rivals on the ideological 
defensive (until they are able to either counter-attack or add a new ideology to the political discourse). 
A political group competing for domestic politicai power can gain politicai space in the 
electoral arena by niaxllniPng its share of the popular vote and presence in institutional bodies andior 
making pst-  or pre- election alliances with rival p p s  that will resnlt in a net increase in its actual 
politicai power. In order to signify an increase in the political space occupied by a particular group, 
political shifts must be foiiowed by an actual increase in that group's poiitical power. In tum, losing 
popular votes or political allies to the attraction of rivais c m  imply the loss of electoral politicai 
space. A politicai coalition c m  gain ideologicai politicai space by increasing the amount of support 
its ideology can generate among public opinion. A begemonic political coalition may even be able to 
change, to its own benefit, a society's ideologicai paradi- Ideological fluctuations c m  corne 
through steady but constant political changes or ihrough the outcome of political crises. The loss of 
ideologicai political space cm be brought about by the loss of momennim in the public debate of 
ideas or by a change in public perception (often caused by changes in the social or political 
environment). 
An increase in a political group's share of domestic political space brings that group greater 
politicai power by increasing its dominance over state policy-making institutions, increasing its 
credibility in the eyes of public opinion, and making it stronger relative to its cornpetitors for 
domestic political space. Electoral success generally gives political parties greater control over state 
institutions, while ideological ascendancy enables parties to affect state policy by influencing both the 
public and policy makers. Electoral and ideological gains also increase a political organization's 
credibility within the domestic political stniggle by endowing it with greater moral legitimacy and 
public support. Both qualities cm be very powerful tools when used to overcome opposition by 
political rivais in the implernentation of policy; on the other hand, it is not difficult to squander either 
moral legitimacy or public support. By gaining politicai space any political group gains relative 
strength vis-à-vis its rivals as it is in a better position to influence policy and rewacd its constituents. 
The acquisition of electoral political space also allows a pariy or coalition to exert increased control 
over state institutions. In tum, control over state resoiures enables politicai organizations to set the 
political agenda and cwpt ,  tbrough rewards or ihreais, different sacial groups. 
1.4. Jhonoiriic Wberaüzation 
Economic Liberalization is generally seen as a process that can aid the amval of politicai 
liberalization in democratizing societies. As noted eariier, according to authors like Samuel 
Huntington (1991) and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufrnan (1995) market-opening masures often 
place added pressure on authontarian mlers to implement democratizing refonas. Here 1 will attempt 
to define the term"economic liberalization," enumerate possible ways of measuring it, examine some 
of the main politicai causes of economic liberalization, and bciefly review sorne of the effects 
economic liôeralization can have on domestic politics. 
Economist Gerd Nonneman defines economic liberaiization in generai as a process that 
includes the following: fint, the decrease of state involvement in a country's economy; second, the 
decrease of state control of economic activity; third, the encouragement of private sector activity in 
the economy; and fourth, the liberalization of foreign trade (Nonneman 1996b: 4). 1 will employ this 
definition for the purpose of my thesis. According to the neo-liberal economic school of thought, 
"[market] -led, short-term efficiency wiii lead to long-tenn growth" (Nonneman 1996b: 4). Bauer, 
Little, Kmeger, and La1 are s o n  of the leading advocates of economic liberaiization today 
(Nonneman 1996b: 4). We can masure the libetalization of a country's economy by examining 
changes in trade volume (relative and absolute), foreign investment patterns, changes in the 
percentage of GDP taken-up by the public sector and state-owned enterprises, tariff levels, and the 
ability of foreign fùms to enter the domestic market (Spindler and Still 1991: 149-152). The generai 
amant of regulation over internai economic activity exerted by the govenunent indicates whether 
economic opening is taking place or not, Thus, the concept of economic liberaiization encompasses 
but is not fimired to that of internationalization. In addition to internationalmtion, the process of 
economic liberaiization includes the reduction of state presence in the domestic economy (e.g., 
through tbe privaîization of state enterprises) and the elimination of other restrictions on private 
economic activity (e.g., thmugh the eiimination of barriers to business expansion). 
The concept of internationaüzation describes a substantiai increase in the international 
component of a nation's econorny. Helen Milner and Robert Keohane, for instance, measure 
internationalization througb changes in trade as a percenrage of a country's Gross Domestic Roduct 
(Milner and Keohane 1996: 4). The remval of controls exercised by a national government almost 
inevitably lead to p a t e r  economic interaction with the outside worid. "Increased international trade 
and capital movement between economies the proportion of each economy exposed to world 
market pressures (the tradables sector) and is therefore likely CO increase the sensitivity of the 
domestic economy to international price trends and shocks" (Milner and Keohane 1996: 16). 
According to Milner and Keohane, internatioaalization increases an economy's vulnerability to 
extemai economic shocks. Milner and Keohane also rneasure internationalization through the ratio of 
a country's net foreign investments to its total domestic assets (19%: 4). Politicai scientists such as 
Jeffrey Frieden, Ronald Rogowski, Frances McCall Rosenbluth, and Stephan Haggard (contributors 
to the book Intemtionaliurtion ond Domestic Politics edited by Milner and Keohane [1996]) 
measure internationalization through the levei of intemational capital flows and financiai rate de- 
regulation (e.g., interest rate de-regulation). 
In order to clearly illustrate the Limitations of current views on the politicai effect of 
economic change, this thesis will employ the concept of economic liberaiization rather than that of 
internationalization. By definition, economic iiberalization is a more powefil independent variable 
than internationalization because it takes into account not only de-regulation of international 
economic interaction but also the de-regulation of domestic economic interaction. So, acconiing to 
the logic of Milner and Keohane's hypothesis, economic Liberaiimtion, as a more powefil 
independent variable than internationaiiion, should certainly have caused poiitical-spatial reform in 
Taiwan and South Korea (both of which experienced extensive economic iiberalization). In other 
words, the cases of Taiwan and South Korea should provide strong support for Miiner aad Keohane's 
hypothesis. As 1 wil l  demonstrate later, bowever, significant political-spatial reform has not taken 
place in these countcies, which ailows me to make a stronger case against Miiner and Keohane's 
arguments- 
Poiitical Conditions Necessmy to Initiate Economic LikrriUzation: 
Heller et ai. (1998) argue that tbere are tbree essential political conditions for economic 
iiberalization to take place in demoçratizing polities. First, liberalization will not be attempted unless 
the political leaders consider refom desirable. The second political condition required for economic 
liberalization is policy makers' belief in their abity to identify plausible altematives (to their old 
policies) that correspond to their preferences. Fmally, liberalization will not occur unless policy 
malcers who favour reform control the political resources necessary to enact and implement the policy 
change (Heller, et al. 1998: 146-47). These three political conditions for economic liberalization 
emphasize the autonomy enjoyed by national govemments in economic policy-making. Failure to 
respond to the demands of powerful economic coalitions may cause a govemment to lose political 
space if these coalitions seek the support of the political opposition or sabotage the govemment's 
economic policies. 
Any set of policies distributes benefits and costs dong the political spectrum. in tum, policy 
reform mdistributes these benefits d costs (Heller et ai. 1998: 149). 'Thus, for political leaders to 
choose to reform their economies, the net expected utiiity from the proposed policy change must 
exceed the expected net value of retaining the illiberal stutus quo . . . Therefore, we expect to see 
liberal refonns only if constituents who support the government stand to enjoy a net gain €rom 
liberalization" (Heller et al. 1998: 150). Political considerations play a key role in determinhg when 
a country enacts market-opening masures, and whether this policy will be sustained (Heller et ai. 
1998: 176). The expected political deshbihty of economic reform is cruciai to the implementation 
of rnarket-opening measures. It is easier for ruling political coalitions to have supporters agree to a 
change in economic policy when there are few policy alternatives available; the more alternatives 
available, the more difficult it is to reach consensus within a ruling coalition (Helier et al. 1998: 157). 
Generai Eîïects d Market-Opening Poück 
Economic iiiraiization geaedy duces the state's control over civil Society as a whole. 
This often results in the increase of politicai itctivity by refonnist groups that oppose the political 
status quo. A reduction in the level of conservative control over the economy aiso allows reformist 
elements to form usehl aiüances with economic elites. A general decrease in economic control can 
easily result in a decrease in political control for conservative groups, Such a loss of politicai control 
can weU bring a sudden drop in politicai power and even public support (when loss of coercive power 
brings the loss of persuasive instruments). Helen Milner and Robert Keohane have argued in the 
book Inremtionalization and Domestic Politics (which they co-edited in 1996) that "[the] likelihood 
of major domestic policy and institutional refonns will grow as internationaiization makes the 
economy more vulnerable to extemdy generated economic shocks"(Mi1ner and Keohane 1996: 18). 
The crises provoked by these shocks "create the 'plitical space' necessary for political entrepreneurs 
to fundamentally reorganize domestic politics" (as noted by institutionaiists Judith Goldstein 1989, 
Stephan Haggard 1988, and Peter Hall 1989) (Milner and Keohane 1996: 16)? in t e m  of my 
definition of political space, this view suggests that economic liberalization would help ceformers 
increase their political space at the expense of conservatives (through electoral and ideological 
competition). 1 do not disagree with the assertion that economic reform can aid politicai-institutional 
reform. However, 1 believe this assertion should be qualifiecl with the argument that economic 
libetalization can actually bolster the political fortunes of conservative political forces once the 
institutional sening within which political competition rakes place has been reformed. 
1 believe there are three plausible reasons for which economic liberalization can preserve or 
increase the political space available to conservatives. First, the policy changes liberalization brings 
(e-g., reducing subsidies to strategic economic sectors or encouraghg market-based competition) can 
inshi feelings of insecurity in the public, which might lead it to make "safe" political choices. This 
can drive large sectors of the population to support potitical parties that seem "safe." Second, if 
economic liberaiization, by providing tangible material benefits to certain social sectors, can actually 
Milner and Keohane's definition of the term "poiitical spaœ" refm mainIy ta the political-institutional aspect 
of domestic politics. 
strengthen the politicai base of conservative poiitical elements by increasing the economic clout of 
consematism's social allies. Greater politicai and economic freedom alIows these allies to provide 
willing support to consemative politicai elements. Third, when the changes provoked by economic 
reform make "political space" available, consewative groups, which often enjoy superior resources, 
are frequently better able than refonnist groups to step into that space. in fact, conservative forces 
often pmue market-opening masures precisely because the short-term instability cause by 
liberalization allows theni to exploit people's insecurities. Under democracy, economic liberalization 
often benefits the same class of people (the middle class) that gave previous authontarian regimes 
passive support. Democratization can turn this previously passive support into active support for 
democratic conservative coalitions. 
Most current literahire on the politicai economy of dernomtic transitions does not explicitly 
discuss the effect of economic reform on political space. Nevenheiess, evidence from this thesis' two 
case studies suggests that arguments asserting that market-opening reforms lead to politicai- 
institutional change are sornewhat rnisleading in regards to domestic political space. Studies positing 
that economic reform aids institutionai change (while not examining political space) implicitly seem 
to suggest that economic reform naturally leads to a realignment of politicai space. In my view, this 
is not necessarily the case. in Figure 1, Milner and Keohane's argument is represented by AA', while 
my argument is represented by AB. By explicitly focusing on the effect economic reform has on 
political space, this thesis attempts to provide a more complete p i c m  of the political results of 
economic libetalization. 
- Figure 1 around hece - 
This thesis does not pretend to explain why conservative political eIements have remained 
powemil in democratizing contries - in most democracies, new or old, consemative parties hold 
considerable political space. Rather, this thesis attempts to study whether ecoaomic iiiralization is a 
political asset or Iiability for conservative parties during and immediately after democratintion. 
Conventionai wisdom States that economic liberalization generally paves tbe way for political 
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liberalization. Cm economic hiralization actuaiiy hold back fiuther refocm after democratization? 
In my view, the very same rniddle ciass hatched by the ecunumic liberalization that Id to 
democratization is the very same midde class that sees this liberalization as a reason to "vote 
conservative." In both Taiwan and South Korea, the rniddle class appears to have played a basically 
conservative role after 1987. 
1.5. Tbesis Odine 
This thesis will conduct the analysis of two case shidies, Taiwan and South Korea in order to 
arrive at s o m  general conclusions on the political effects of economic liberalization. The approach 
employed will be mainly empirical and inductive. in order to analyze these two cases, indicators (in 
the areas of i d e ,  finance, etc.) that illustrate the degree of economic and financial Liberaiization will 
be usad as the independent variables. Political-spatial outcornes (expressed through electoral 
cornpetition, political iûignments and the politicai discourse) will serve as the dependenr variables. 
The conclusions d m  from the siudy of political developments in Taiwan and South Korea will be 
contrasted with the hypothesis advanced by Helen Milner and Robert Keohane in their Introduction to 
Intemtionulizufion and Dontestic Politics (1996: 16). This conmt  rnight yield some conclusions 
that lead to the fomlation of broader theoretical implications. 
Cbapters Two and Three will study the moves toward economic lihralization in Taiwan and 
South Korea and the impact these policies have had on the political space of each country. The 
analysis of economic liberalization will require the sludy of policy initiatives in areas such as finance, 
investment, international trade, agriculture, and currency exchange. Tbe analysis of the political 
effects of Liberalization will require the study of electoral redis,  plitical party alignments, and 
public opinion. Chapter Two and Three will each conclude by reviewing s o n  lessons wc might 
draw h m  the empuical evidence provideci by the two case studies. Cbaptet Four wiii attempt to 
fomnilate a cbeoretical mode1 on the political effect of economic Iikralization by conîsasting îhe two 
case stuclies and ushg Iessons dram h m  Cbapters Two and Three. The foutth chapter will also 
attempt to point out sorne areas within the debate on economic sources of domestic politics that migbt 
be open to furthet research. The thesis will conclude by speculating on sorne of the possible 
impücaîions its conclusions might have for other countries and for broader theoretical debates - 
debates over issues such as the "second image reversed" concept, dernocratization, the political d e  
of the middle class, electoral patterns, and voting behaviour, 
CHAPTER TWO: THE REPUBLIC OF CBINA ON TAIWAN (TAIWAN) 
in Taiwan, the effects of economic and financial liberalization have manifested themselves 
most clearly thmughout the 1980s and 1990s. While this process produced sorne dislocation in 
Taiwan's economy, it has not brought about an economic or financial crisis. Parallel to economic and 
fuiancial liberalization, Taiwan began its dernocratization pmess in the mid-1980s- 1 believe 
Taiwan's recent history provides empirical evidence in support of my hypothesis mainly because the 
changes prompted by economic and fiancial de-regulation did not, from a social or political 
perspective, allow the opposition or reformist forces in Taiwan to take advantage of the rather "fluid" 
socio-economic situation and decisively increase the political space available to them (see Figure 2). 
in fact, the Kuomintang and its allied social groups have been able to maintain or even increase their 
share of the politicai space. The KMT has consistently claimed that only it cm provide rapid 
economic growth and politicai stabiiity simultmeously (Copper 1998: 149). 
- Figure 2 mund here - 
2.1. Historical backnround 
Like Korea, the island of Taiwan spent most of the first half of the twentieth century under 
Japanese mle. With the end of World War II in August 1945, Taiwan became Chinese territory again 
and came under the jucisdiction of Chiang Kai-shek's government. Kuomintang troops quickly 
disembarked on the island and clashes between these troops and the local populations promptly 
enipted. Native Taiwanese resented the arrogance and comption of the KMTs officiais and 
military. Demonstrations against KMT mle and in favour of p a t e r  Taiwanese autonomy were met 
with brutal repression by KMT forces, which killed, jailed or massacred thousands of Taiwanese 
inteiiectuals, social leaders, and students (Laiiirté 1997: 8). The most infamous of these incidents 
occwred on Febmary 28,1947, when a massacre of aati-KMT demonsmtors took place in Taipei. 
Thus, the Taiwanese people were mbjugated by force. in spite of its ability to repress anti-KMT 
Figure 2: Taiwan's Economic Libraliaion and Political Dynamics 
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movetnents on Taiwan, the Nationalists were unable to maintain their grip over the cest of China. By 
1949, the Chinese Communisw had ovemin the entire Mainland and ended Nationalkt rule there. 
Chiang Kai-shek fled wiib numemus Knomintang followers to Taiwan, where he set up tbe 
govemment of the Republic of China "in exile." 
Far years Chiang dreamt of re-conquering the Mainland. He simply saw Taiwan as a 
springboard for the eventual invasion of China proper. Ongoing conflict with Communist China was 
used to justify the continued imposition of Martial Law on the isiand of Taiwan. Al1 political activity 
contrary to KMT policies was suppressed. Up to the 1980s. mainlanders (individuals otiginally h m  
Mainland China. not Taiwan) dominated the KMT. This was a source of ongoing tension with the 
local population. In spite of a repressive political nile and the state of siege under which Taiwan 
lived, the KMT oversaw the rapid economic development 0lTaiwa.n. Throughout the 1950s and 
196ûs, the government developed export-oriented policies that eventually provided Taiwan with a 
huge crade surplus. Taiwan's export leddevelopment brought about the rise of an eâucaied rniddle 
class and a vigorous civil society. Underground challenges to KMT mle grew in the 19709, and in 
1986 Chiang Ching-ho, Chiang Kai-shek's son, began the process of democratizing Taiwan by 
legalizing the main opposition party, the Dernomtic Progressive Party (DPP). Martial Law was 
W l y  lifted in 1987, together wiih the law for the "Period of Mobilization for Suppressing the 
Communist Rebellion." 
Both Chiang Kai-shek and (3hiang Ching-kuo presided over periods of cemarkable growth in 
Taiwan's economy. M e r  attempting to implement some import-substitution policies in the 1950s, 
Chiang Kai-shek's tegime committed itseif to export-oriented economic policies. The Taiwanese 
govenunent encouraged the formation of small and tnedium manufacnuing companies that could 
compte on world markets; the KMT delikrately prevented the formation of large corporate 
conglomeraies in order to avoid possible challenges to its own power (Cheng and Lin 1999: 23 1). 
While the Taiwanese goveniment encwraged the export of products, stringent resûïctions rernained 
on imports and the ability of foreign hancial entities to operate in Taiwan. The Taiwanese public 
was prevented h m  investing capital abroad in order to ensure dornestic investment went only into 
domestic economic activities (Goldstein 1997: 34-35)- The wealth created by rapid economic p w t h  
was rather evenly distributed. This was partly the result of an effective land reform program 
implemented by the KMT in the 1950s (Cheng and Lin 1999: 230). 
While equitable economic growth and land redistribution provided "social balanceï' to 
Taiwan, economic growîh did bring politicai pressure to bear on the KMT. Changes at both the 
dornestic ana international level encouraged Chiang Ching-kuo to begin the democratization pmcess. 
At the domestic level, the rise of civil society and growth of opposition raised the political costs of 
sustaining Martial Law. Economic growth and social development contributed to the rise of an 
educated middle class, more critical of the govemment and desirous of political rights for itself. Tt 
was necessary for the Kuomintang to appeai to this growing sector of the population througb 
persuasion rather than coercion. Democratization would be one way of attracting the continued 
support of the middle class and acquiring legitimacy in its eyes. The continued repression of the 
population's poiitical rights ensured the strengthening of the DPP. Pcesident Chiang Ching-ho was 
faced with the choice of maintainhg a cepressive policy or facing the DPP at the ballot box. in 
addition, as the passage of time made the possibility of re-unification with the Mainland more remoie, 
the KMT's claim to be the legitimate government of al1 China began to ring hollow. The K M T ' s  
Mainland origins began to seem a political liability as Taiwanese society developed and experienced 
economic success while separated h m  the Mainland. 
At the international level, democratization movements around other parts of tbe world had 
some influence on Taiwan's public opinion. Specificaiiy, the Taiwanese followed with great interest 
the "People Power" movement that toppled the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines. The easing of 
cross-strait tensions with the accession of Deng Xiao-ping to power in China (m 1978) also led the 
KMT to consider relaxing its iron-gcip on Taiwan's political life. in the 1980s the two govemments 
in Beijing and Taipei agreed to d o w  the establishment of postal and cultural links açross the Taiwan 
Sirait. Thus, the KMT could not use the excuse of national security as the reason for its ongoing 
authoritarian d e  as easily as before. In my view, domestic political considerations were essentiai to 
Chiang Ching-kuo's decision to conmKnce the democratization process in 1986-88. 
Resident Chiang Chhg-kuo abolished Martial Law on July 15,1987, Chiang apparently 
realized that Taiwan was ready for democratization, and that the KMT could still uphold its political 
hegemony in a democratic Taiwan. The KMT faced the foiiowing choice in the late 1980s: it could 
continue its authoritarian nile, and keep aiienating large sectors of the local population, or it could 
preside over the democratization process and take credit for it. Chiang Ching-kuo and his successor 
(hm 1988) Lee Tung-hui, decided in favour of the latter course. While wide sectocs of the 
Taiwanese population favoured an end to authotiîarian rule, public opinion genecaily credited the 
KZllT with staging Taiwan's brilliant record of economic growth. In addition, inhabitants of Taiwan 
who considered themselves "Chinese" ratfier than 'Taiwanese" continued to support the KMT's 
officiai goal of eventual reunification with Mainland China Thus, when the KMT began the process 
of democratization it could count on the political support of large sectors of the voting population. 
This section will review the recent efforts of the Taiwanese govemment to libedize domestic 
fuiancial controls and to open Taiwan's internai market to greater foreign cornpetition. 1 will 
conclude this section by briefly commenthg on some of the socio-economic consequences of 
economic tiberalization in Taiwan. Taiwan kgan the pursuit of a liberalizing foreign economic 
policy in the 1970s and 1980s. This process was accelerated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with 
the liberalization of Taiwan's foreign direct investment, foreign exchange, and capital markets (see 
Table 1 for general economic indicators). 
-Table 1 mmd here - 
LiberPllzing Memures Up To 
While today market forces largely govem Taiwan's economic and financial markets, this was 
TABLE 1 : MAJOR INDICATORS OF TAIWAN'S ECONOMY, 1987-1998 
Source: 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China (1999: 4, 13-14, 206,260,264) 
GNP (US$ million at Current Prioes) 
Total Value of Exports (US$ million)' 
ExporWGNP Ratio (%) 
Total Value of lmports (US$ million)' 
Imports/GNP Ratio (%) 
Total Ouîward lnvestment (US$ mllion) 
Total Foreign and Overaeaa Chinase 
lnvestment in Taiwan (US8 million) 
Real Growth Rate of Fixed Capital 
Formation by Govemmnt (36) 
Real Growth Rate of Flxed Capital 
Formation by Public Enterpriser (%) 
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not the case until recently. M y  in the late 1970s and early 1980s did the govemment start to relax its 
control over industrial and financial policies. We can identify four phases in Taiwan's recent 
industriaikation: fmt, the phase of import-substitution policies in the 1950s; second, the export- 
oriented indusüialization phase of the 1Ws; third, the second phase of import substitution during the 
1970s; and fourth, the iiberalization and globalization phase since the early 1980s (Hsiao and Cheng 
1999: 116). The 1961 Stamte for the Encouragement of lnvesment placed some considerable 
restrictions on foreign investment in Taiwan. Taiwan began a sustained effort to open its markets 
after recovering from the second oil crisis - exchange rate regulations were Iiberaiized and tariff and 
quota levels were reduced (Ravich 20I10: 121). in Febmary 1979 the foreign exchange system was 
officially converted from a fmed exchange rate regirne to a flexible regime (Lin 1996: 160). in 
Novernber of 1980 the Central Bank of China promulgated the Essentiuls of Interest Rate Adjusrment, 
which "pennitted a wider range in the difference between maximum and minimum loan rates on 
certificates of deposit and on some other money market instruments" (Lin 1996: 159). 
By the early to mid-1980s, Taiwan was ready for liberalization because of its high savings 
rate, successive balanced govemment budgets, and a Iow inflation rate (lm 1996: 158). 'To further 
international integration and maintain a steady flow of foreign direct investment, a central state 
trading system was estabiished in the foreign exchange market in 1982" (Ravich 2000: 121). in order 
to absorb increased foreign reserves and money supplies, it was necessary for the economy to rely on 
more flexible interest rates and foreign exchange rates (Lin 1996: 158). An economic slowdown in 
1984 sparked concems over the international competitiveness of Taiwan's enterprises. This led to the 
creation of an economic reform committee under the Executive Yuan in order to draft proposals for 
"economic rejuvenation." The cornmittee's fhal proposals included economic liberalizatioa and 
internatiooalization, a reduction of the public sector, and more private participation in certain areas of 
the economy (McBeath 1998: 167). After March 1985, ciifferences in prim rates among banks "were 
not only officiaüy recognized, but actuaiiy encouraged" &in 1996: 159). The Central Interbaok Caü 
Rate System was abolished so each bank w d d  determîne its own rates. In September 1985 the 
Regdations for Interest Rate Management were abolished, an act that would allow for wider ranges 
between maximum and minimum loan rates @id.). 
Taiwan's huge trade surpluses in the mid-1980s caused a rapid appreciation of the NT dollar; 
in 1986-87 the Central Bank intewened to slow down the appreciation. However, the gradual quality 
of the appreciation caused the market to continuously expect further appreciations - this resulted in a 
huge speculative capital inflow that fuelled the initial problems created by the trade surplus and 
inflated stock and real estate markets (Lin 1996: 161). Under pressure from its main trading partners, 
especialiy the United States, efforts to liberalize Taiwan's economy were accelerated in the 1980s 
(Hsiao and Cheng 1999: 119). Direct foreign investment helped build Taiwan's export market and 
technology (Ravich 2000: 121). "Taiwan was able to overcome the economic setbacks of the late 
1970s and early 1980s by relying on the mechanisms chat had origindly created its stunning growth - 
successfully shifting h m  low-tech, low skilled agriculture and rnanufacturing to higher-value-added, 
higher-skilied production (thereby increasing the level of productivity) and by opening its financial 
sector to more competition" (Ravich 2000. 123). in 1986 foreign branches were allowed to set-up 
branches in Taiwan (Ravich 2000: 121). In May 1987 foreign exchange controls were relaxed to 
ailow and to encourage direct capital outflow by the non-bank private sector (e.g., the allowable 
outward yearly rernittance per adult was increased to US $5 million) and in June 1987 for the first 
time capital movement was permitted to the general public (Lin 1996: 162-63). 
Liberallzlng Mecisures Since 19a1. 
in 1987 foreign exchange controls were removed; import tariffs and import restrictions were 
reduced; Taiwan "opened its domestic market to foreign competition in fast f d  s e ~ c e s ,  banks, 
insurance, and leasing agencies" (Ravich 2000: 121). Average tarüf levels dropped h m  32% in 
1980 to 13% in 1989. Taiwan's "sluggish" economic gmwth in the mid-1980s "stimulateci a search 
for ways to Uaprove ecoaornic efficiency and productivity" (McBeath 1998: 188). The removal of 
governmnt protection for Taiwanese enterprises in the domestic market is forcing these companies to 
change their modus operandi. The entry of foreign competitors into Taiwan's domestic banking and 
insurance market has also placed new slrains on Taiwanese financial institutions. Since the mid- 
1980s there has been an ongoing drive to liberalize Taiwan's domestic fuiancial markets. The initial 
de-regulation of the domestic capital market, foreign exchange market, securities market, and bankiag 
industry took place in the late 1980s (Lin 1996: 168-169). These measures have increased the 
economic importance of the financial sector and have induced a much tighter links between the 
capital market in Taiwan and the global capital market (Lin 19%: 157). "In particular, the relaxation 
of restrictions on capital movements in the 1987-1991 pend fonned the necessary foundation for 
globalization, and the revised Banking Law of July 1989 contnbuted greatly to both the liberalization 
and globalization processes" (Lin 19%: 169). This law removed conuols on al1 deposit and loan 
interest rates; today, market forces largely determine interest rates in Taiwan (Lin 1996: 159). 
Between 1989 and 1993 restrictions on outward and inward capital movernent by the public were 
continuously reduced due in part to the pressure on the NT dollar to appreciate (Lin 1996: 163). 
The NT dollar's value was allowed to float within certain limits until 1989, when it was 
allowed to float freely (Ravich 2000: 122). in July of the same year, the revised Banking Law was 
implemented, which entailed the abolition of al1 controls over interest rates; "the banking market in 
Taiwan has becorne very cornpetitive" (Yu 1998: 152). International capital movernent was 
perrnitted to the general public for the first time in June 1987, and between May 1987 and October 
1992, the individual limit of capital private citizens were aliowed to import or expon was steadily 
increased up to US $5 million (th 1996: 162-163).' The timing of the liberalization of capital 
movement was effective: resmctions to the outwad movement of rernittances were relaxed 
when there was no pressure to export capital, while testrictions on the inward movement of capital 
were relaxed when there was no pressure to irnport capital. The liberalization of the securities market 
has also been one of the govemmeni's goals in the past years (Li 1996: 168). The forecast for the 
The aiiowed yearly limit on outward remittance was rapidly incteased up to ü S  $5 million by the end of 1987. 
in contrast, the aiiowd yearly limit on ïnwarci temittance di i  not reach that amount until October 1992 (Lin 
1996: 163). 
1991-1996 period predicted a faster growth rate for Unports (8.7%) than for exports (6.1%)' as 
Taiwan's domestic markets were opend to foreign competition in the banking, insurance, leasing, 
and fast food sectom (Ravich 2000: 121). Taiwan's stock exchange was open to foreign investors in 
199 1 due to pressure from the United States. As a result of negotiations for enûance in the World 
Trade Organization, Taiwan raised the ceiling for individual foreign institutional investors in 
Taiwan's stock exchange to $600 million (from $50 million). The allowable foreign ownership 
proportion in each Taiwanese Company was raised to 15% for individuai foreign institutions (ftom 
5%), while the total foreign ownership proportion in each local enterprise was raised to 30% from 
10% (Chu 1999b: 192). 
The 1990s have also seen the implementation of plans to pnvatize stateswned enterprises 
(SOE) in ~aiwan? According to Gerald McBeath, "[Taiwan's economy] is a mmre industriai 
economy chat is probably freer of govemment intervention and more liberal than at any previous 
time" (McBeath 1998: 251). In part those plans were a result of concem over Taiwan's international 
competitiveness; in part this was done to anticipate foreign pressures on the Taiwanese government to 
stepup its liberalization program (McBeath 1998: 164-167). For the past years, the indirect effect of 
SOEs in Taiwan has been to check conglomerate and multinational control of Taiwan's political 
economy (and thus sustain the power of the state) (McBeath 1998: 167). Between 1969 and 1995, 
GDP share of the SOEs declined h m  17.8% to 10.8% (McBeath 1998: 166). The privatization 
program is ongoing; within the next few years the govemment will continue privatizing a number of 
prominent SOEs. However, employees of these corporations are cesistant to changes that represent an 
uncertain future (McBeath 1998: 180-181). Moreover, the KMT is "suspect" in regards to the 
privatization of SOEs because even if it initiated the program, it has forged numemus alliances with 
conglomerate groups (or even KMT enterprises themselves), which stand to benefit h m  privatization 
(McBeath 1998: 179). There are fears within Taiwan that big business will control the ongoing 
privatization program (McBeath 1998: 180). On its part, the DPP supports privatization and it poses 
'III 1989,122 public enterprises employai almost 280,000 workers (McBeath 1998: 178). 
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as a champion of small and medium enterprises (McBeaih 1998: 179-180). 
Socio-Ecodc Results of Ecbnomic Liberaiizadon: 
Overall, economic globalization and deregulation have been a success in Taiwan (Lin 1996: 
169). This opening was done sequentially; Taiwan aiready bad a sound industrial base before 
economic liberalization Cook place (Cotton 2000: 153). While there ûre som indications that 
differences in wealth may have increased slightly over the past decade (sec Table 2). liberalization in 
Taiwan has been a much less traumatic process than in South Korea. Liberalization has not resulted 
in financial disorder or in the increased market domination of powertùl conglomerates. This has 
much to do with both the antecedent conditions of the Taiwanese economy and sound economic 
management. Taiwan's economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s distributed newly created weaith in 
an equitable marner. The fact that Taiwan's indusuial and manufacninng sectors are largely 
composed of small enterprises has made the Taiwanese economy flexible enough to respond 
adequately to changes in market conditions (Noble 1999: 150). This has aiso resulted in an overall 
absence of conflict betwecn business and organized labour that might have k e n  exacerbated by 
economic liberalization. In addition, the Taiwanese government skilfully began to impiement liberal 
economic policies before democratization twk place; this fact minimized the level of political input 
into the decision-making process. 
- Table 2 around here - 
In spite of Taiwan's ability CO sustain its economic growth, liberalization has brought some 
dislocation to Taiwan's economy in ment  years. The number of factory cbsing has increased while 
unemployment hit a ten-year high in 19% (Goldstein 1997: 67-68). Taiwanese banks and 
corporations are in the pmcess of adapting to a new envimnment. No longer c m  they depend on the 
government to protect them h m  foreign competition. These changes are affecting the pcïotities of 
economic and political mors m Taiwan. The need to be cornpetitive and adapt to changing 
circumstances can breed a climate of political uncectainty for many sectors of the population. 

in recent years the income gap has widened, and it is increasingly difficult for small enterprises to 
enter the domestic market (Chu and Lin 19%: 87). Thus, on one hand successful economic 
Liberaiization prevented the opposition fiom using the issue of the economy against the KMT. On the 
dher hand, liberalization has also made prominent the need to maintain Taiwan's competitiveness in 
a global economy. This realization bas also favoured the KMT politicaliy by making its disciplined 
fiscal appmch more attractive than the economic policies of its rivals. In addition, liberalization has 
left certain social groups more vulnerable to economic change; if these groups value stability they 
will support the KMT. The magnitude of economic policy changes may have been minimi& by the 
faci ihat Taiwan has not suffered any serious economic downtum, but this does not mean that change 
has n d  taken place or that the public does not perceive it. 
In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s' the conservative forces (represented by the KMT 
and later also by the New Party and James Soong) still dominated Taiwan's politid space, contmy 
to what Milner and Keohane's hypothesis might lead us to believe. As Table 3 shows, conservative 
forces have consistently won over 50% of the total vote in national elections since 1989.~ 
Furthemiore. as Table 4 indicates, conservative forces have continued to occupy a clear majority of 
the seats in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly throughout the 1990s. Thus. Taiwan's 
conservatives have maintained control over the "electoral" aspect of Taiwan's political space. 
Consematives have also continued to dominate the "ideologicaVpolicy discourse" dimension of 
political space (in Taiwan's context, debates over economic poiicy and national identityh- 
unification). As the niling party oversaw Taiwan's rapid aod equitable economic growth and 
managed the transition to democracy quite smoothly it was able to gain considerable credit for iis 
economic policies. Public opinion and even opposition groups recognized the KMT's achievements, 
TabIe 3 also iacludes the 1997 Municipal Assembties elections, in which the KMT gameted fewer votes ihan 
the DPP. 
3 1 
as we wili describe in detail later? In contrast, the DPP's level of public support on economic issues 
suffered h m  its generai perception throughout the 1990s as a "leftist party inclined toward 
socialism" (Copper 1998: 54). Furthemore, on the question of nationd identitylre-unification with 
China, the DPP has been unable to overtum the KMT's ideological dominance (see Table 5). The 
DPP, the W s  main rival for political space, was quickly increasing its public support. The DPP 
benefited politically from its long opposition to authontarian rule and its stand as a champion of 
"Taiwanese" nationhood and the less favoud social classes. Throughout the 1990s, the DPP was 
able to harass and weaken the KMT's ideological control over Taiwanese Society. However, the 
KMT maintained its dominance over the policy agenda even on noneconornic issues (as exemplified 
in Table 5). ' 
-Tables 3,4 and 5 mund here - 
Political Space, 1987=19%: 
The size of Taiwan's political space expanded rapidly after 1987 as a series of politicai- 
institutional r e fom took place. In July of that year Martial Law was abolished. In June 1990 the 
KMT and the DPP agreed to hold a direct presidential election in the near future (Ravich 2000: 128). 
In 1992, after the retirement of the Irist deputies that had been elected before 1949, Taiwan held the 
first "non-supplementary" (Le., ail seau were "Up for grabs") election for the Legislative Yuan. In 
addition, opposition groups such as the DPP gained increasingiy free access to the media. In spite of 
these institutional changes, Taiwan's conservatives were able to maintain their predominance over 
domestic political space. As Yun-han Chu points out in a perceptive article (1999a), after initial gains 
by the DPP berneen 1989 md 1993, fluctuations within Taiwan's electorai landscripe subsequently 
decreased. An apparent "point of equiiibrium" was reached after 1994: the DPP was unable to 
Widespread corruption, maidander ongins, and heavy-handed Iactics, itiough, burt the Kh4T potitically. The 
DPP exploited this to its politicai advanrage. 
in ihe coatext of Taiwan's potitics, therefore, consecvatives are asmi& with: a desire for eventuai 
ceunincation with Mainland China, Chinese (rather than 'Taiwaae~t") cuiiuraI identity, proximity to big 
business intense and established pressure groups such as famie~s, and traditiond social values. 

TABLE 4; SEAT D~STRIBUTION' FOLLOWlNG TAIWAN'S NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, 19891998 
~ ~ h t i v d  
76.9% 
DPP 
New ~ a r t f  
Sourcar: 
a)  Hsiao, Hsh-Huang Michael and Cheng Hsiao-shih (1999: 124) 
b) Rigger, Shelley (1 999: 138-1 39, 158) 
c) Elections in Taiwan (2000) 









1, % of lotal seais. 
2, The Legislaiive Yuan is the iegislaîive branch of the ROC central govemrnent. 
16.6% 
N/A ' 
3, The ~ational Assembty is the institutional organ charged with enacting constitutional arnendrnents. These were the first 'non-supplementar)r 
(wllhouî the parliclpation of legislators ekted on the Mainland before 1949) elections to the National Assembly. 
4, First 'non-supplemenlaw eleclbns to the Legislative Yuan. 







































TABLE 5: OPlNlON SURVEYS IN TAIWAN ON CHINESE UNlflCATiON AND 
NATIONAL IDENTITY, 1983 AND 19W 
19% 
31.8% 






1 0.8Oh I 17.9% 
1 National Wenüty 
soum: 
Cheng Tungjen and Chia-iung Lin (1 99& 248) 
I I 
1993 
60th Talwanem and Chlnsrs 
1998 
33.8% I 50.4% l 
continue increasing its vote share, and in the mid- and late-1990s the KMT retaineû its political 
hepmony, albeit in a less extreme way than before. The KhWs electoral decline was halted by 
1994-1996, and "the erosion of the KMT's electoral strength U1 elections for national repcesentative 
bodies was balanced by impressive gains in the two newly instituted popular elections for the 
executive offces (of President and Govemor of the "Province" of Taiwan)" (Chu 1999a: 73). In 
Chu's view, the DPP did worse the closer the elective offices at stake were to the apex of executive 
power (1999a: 76). While the DPP significantly increased its share of the political space, it was not 
able to break the KMT's hegemony, in part due to its lack of rural support and its inability to break 
the KMT's hold over large sections of the middle class (Chu 1999a: 85; Copper 1998: 147). 
The KMT's vote share did drop sharply between elections in 1989 (70%) and 1993 (47.4%). 
However, this decline did not continue and the KMT's vote share stabilized after 1994. In the 
eiection for Govemor of the "Province" of Taiwan that year, James Swng, a KMT stalwart, received 
56.2% of the votes cast! in the 1994 gubematorial (to chwse the govemor of the "province" of 
Taiwan) and rnayoral elections, economic issues had Little salience. ''The fact that the economy was 
doing weU no doubt helped the KMT since it [was] the ~ l i n g  party and [was] the party of the srutus 
quo" (Copper 1998: 53). Expansionary DPP policies appeared in an unfavourable light due to 
excessive govemrnent spending and the need to maintain international competitiveness (Copper 1998: 
54). In 1994 James Swng criticized the DPP for trying to "change the sky" with its radical policies 
(Copper 1998: 44). Dwing the campaign leading CO the 1995 Legislative Yuan election, the KMT 
continued to p o m y  itself as the party of stability and economic growth. "The DPP's cal1 for it free 
economy sounded good when t a h g  of privathhg state- and part-owned enterprises, but not 
otherwise, insofar as the DPP had gone on record as advocating more public spending and was 
generally perceived by the electorate as a party favouring socialism" (Copper 1998: 70). Moreover, 
the KMî mponded to demands for social services with its own social welfare program, thus 
111 1994 the KMT also won the aayorship of Kaoshiung, Taiwan's second largest city, though its candidate 
last the mayocal contest in Taipei. 
nianaging to be "al1 things to al people" (Chu 1999a: 8 3 .  
Through its more varied social base and its greater presence in political institutions, the KMT 
was able throughout the 1990s to continue shaping the public &baie over most political issues. In 
addition, Lee Tung-hui's popularity as the k t  naîive Taiwanese president of the ROC was a great 
asset for the lCI4T.l The public generally perceivecl the W s  economic and fuiancial initiatives as 
necessary, while the DPP's economic platfom were successfuiiy portrayed by the ?MT as 
"irresponsibie." in the realrn of foreign affairs, the KMT's position (officiaily in favour of eventual 
reunification with China, while seeking international recognition for the ROC as a sovereign entity) 
enjoyed more widespread support than the D W s  pro-independence policy. It is tme, though, that in 
the policy areas of crime and corruption the IUîT was o k n  on the defensive. Nevertheless, Lee 
Tung-hui held the political initiative during most of his tenure, while implementing institutional and 
economic refonn. 
A new phenomenon that appeared on Taiwan's political scene in the early 1990s was the 
New Party (NP). In 1993 former KMT politicians wtio were critical of President Lee Tung-hui's 
policies founded the NP. The NP's founders were especially upset with what they saw as Lee's 
lukewarm attitude toward reunification with China. To begin with, they were suspicious of the fact 
that Lee Tung-hui is a native Taiwanese. The NP accused Lee of secretly wurking toward Taiwan's 
fonnal independence. In spite of its pro-unification stance, the NP was able to pmject a rather 
"modern" image as a new and "clean" party. While its politics were essentiaily conservative, it 
competed with the KMT for support among the professional classes and state employees, and wiih the 
DPP for support among s d l  business owners and oftïce workers (Chu 1999: 85). The NP, though, 
has been uoable to break tbe K h î T ' s  hold over the mral vote (Chu 1999: 85). The NP'S main politicai 
accomplishment coosisted of weakening the K M T ' s  support amang certain socid classes and 
maidander voters. In rbe 1996 presidential election the NP's garnered almost 15% of the 
By 1988 s h n  out of the KMT's tôirty-one Ctairal Smding Cornmitte members were native Taiwanese 
(Ravich 2000: 128). 
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vote, but in recent times the NP'S ppularity has sagged. It remains to be seen whether NP supporters 
will cehini to the KMT fold or continue to split the conservative vote. 
Evidence that the KMT continued to be regarded as the superior economic manager is 
provided by a study conducted by John Fuh Sbeng Hsieh et ai. (1998). The swveys conducted for 
tbis study before the 1996 presidential elections show that a majority of those polled felt the 
economic situation had worsened over the previous year? b spite of this, a majority also felt the 
economy would irnprove and rated Lee Tung-hui as the best economic manager of al1 candidates. 
Thus, voters rated the KMT's nominee as the best qudified to handle the economy in spite of the 
(slight) recent economic slowdown (Hsieh et al. 1998: 394). In fact, fully 70% of those suneyed 
n m d  Lee as better able than other candidates to tackle economic issues. It appears that, in the frst 
direct presidential election, the KMT benefited from both its past economic successes and the current 
economic uncertainty. This might be an indication that economic change and liberalization can 
actually help the incumbent that is petceived as a "safe" choice. Suneys around the time of the 19% 
election also seem to indicate chat, in spite of the publicity attached to it, national security was not the 
predominant issue on voters' minds. Uncertainty over the stock market, housing prices and the 
economy overall aiso led many voters to choose Lee, the "known quantity" (Copper 1998: 120). 
While the DPP may have stnick a cod with many Taiwanese voters when accusing the KMT 
of corruption and vowing to promote a 'Taiwanesd* rather tban a "Chinese" identity in Taiwan, it 
was still viewed as an unknown quantity by many. The DPP's aim was "to win more support h m  
the lower and middle classes, because during the process of democratization, the KMT had massively 
a b s o M  local factions and big busuiesses into its power centre, thereby transforming itself from a 
catch-al1 party to a centre-right coalition dominated by the politicaliy and economically privileged" 
(Cheng and Lin 1999: 243). On issues such as Taiwan's relations with China or economic 
8 According to this study's suyey's, 66.8% ofcespondents felt Taiwan's economy had "gotten worse" over the 
year prior to the March 1% election (Hsieh et al. 1998: 388). 
management, the innovations pmposed by the DPP may have appeared de-stabilizing to the island's 
micidie class. The KMT was viewed as an experienced and stable party whose nile brougbt economic 
prosperity . in an era of globalization and change the KhîT's experience was an electoral asset. In 
spite of its authontarian pas& the K,MT always retained strong links with civil society (Cheng and Lin 
1999 232). This allowed it to compte for popular support on an equai footing with newer rivals. 
Yun-han Chu (1999a) has written that after âemocratization the KMT maintauied its hold over the 
major socioeconomic groups and state employees (see Table 6). in the 1995 electoral contests the 
KMT retained the support of 54% of office workers, 55% of setf-employed workers, 64% of farmers, 
51% of labourers, 60% of state employees, and 61% of housewives (Chu 1999a: 85). 
- Table 6 around here - 
Politicai Space, Vl96Resent: 
The glow fmm Lee Tung-hui's electoral victory in 19% seemed to fade rather quickly. 
Concerns about public safety and cross-sirait relations were at the forefront of public debate. 
Meanwhile, economic reform continued, Foreign cornpetition increased funher, and privatization of 
additional state-owned enterprises took place. The DPP continued to score points off the KMT by 
criticizing widespcead comption and posing as a champion of the "Taiwanese" identity. It is 
undeniable that in recent years the pro-Îndependentist movement has k e n  süengthened, though most 
voters may stiU favour the smtus quo with Mainland China. The DPP regrouped after its crushing 
defeat in the 1996 presidential electims, and in the Novernber 1997 municipal elections for the first 
time obtained a greater share of the vote than the KMT (43% to 42%). The KM' did especially 
poorly in large cities, However, îhe foliowing year the tables were turned. The KM' obtained a 
sizeable victory in the 1998 Legislative Yuan elections. Meanwhile, the effects of the Asian financial 
crisis were mcking East Asia, Taiwan was one of tbe few countrks tbat were able to avoid fmciat 
coliapse, though economic gcowth did slow somewhat io 1997-98. At any rate, the K M T ' s  economic 
policies seemed to be vindicated by Taiwan's strong economic performance in the rniûâle of a region- 
TABLE 6: PARTISAN SUPPORT AMONG OCCUPATlONAL GROUPS IN TAiWAN: 1992 AND 1995 ELECTIONS 
1 1 1 1995 Ektion 1 1992 Election 
Occupation KM1 DPP 
Business Owner 44% 50% 
ManagerlPrderslonal 
. . -  
77% 19% 
Of ice Workbr 68% 28% 
Saîfcernployeâ Labour 68% 2B0/6 
Farmer 67% 25% 
Labour 58% 37% 
Sîate Emplop 85% 12% 
Coikge Stueknt 76% 15% 
Independent KM1 DPP NP Independent 
6% 46% 31 % 16% 6% 
4% S5Oh 25Oh 32% 8% --
5% 54% 1 6"b 22% 7% 
Source: 
Chu, Yun-han (109Ba: 84) 
wide recession. 
Unfoctunately for the KMT, the late 1990s saw the emergence of serious intemal rifts within 
the Party. Most KlllT members assunied tbat Lien Chan, then-vice president, would be nominated by 
the party to be the KMT's presidential candidate in the 2000 elections (Lee Tung-hui would retire as 
president that year). However, James Soong, fonner Govemor of the Rovince of 
Taiwan challenged the decision of party elders, Soong was a popular politician of Mainland 
extraction, who nevertheless performed very well in the 1994 gubernatorial election, gamering 56.2% 
of the vote. When it was made clear to him that Lien would be the party's nominee, Soong bolted the 
KMT with numemus followers. This represented a veritable split within the party. As a Mainiander, 
Soong could appeal to the sizeable MainJander vote. As a populist, he could draw support fram the 
mainstream middle class that had generally supported the KMT. in policy terms, though, he and his 
followers essentially seemed to represent continuity with KMT policies. In fact, among the three 
main candidates, his position on cross-strait relations was perceived as the most conciliatory toward 
Mainland China. Soong's defection ensured Chen's victory in the March 2000 elections with a 
plurality of the vote. At this moment it is not clear whether Soong will fonn his own political party 
or rejoin the KMT in sorne fonn of coalition. 
Much has been made of the fact that Chen Sui-bian, the DPP's nominee, recentiy won the 
March 2000 presidential elections. The election of a DPP Ieader to the highest office is undoubtedly 
a historic change for Taiwan, but for the moment 1 do not ihii it represents a fundamental shift 
within Taiwan's political space for ihe foilowing reason: Chen won with 39.3% of the vote, while 
Lieu Chan and James Soong together received about 60% of the vote. Although Lien and Soong ran 
as rivals on separate tickets, both are KMT old-timers, steeped in KMT traditions and training. In 
some ways Soong represents a throwback h m  cunent KMT poiicies, as he is a mriinlander whose 
China poiicy was seen as the most conciliatory of the three main candidates, as noted earlier. 
Moreover, Chen actuaiiy received a d e r  percentage of the votes than the DPP attained in, for 
instance, the 1997 municipal elections, when the DPP obiained 43% to the KLIIT's 42%. It may be 
that conservative forces in Taiwan will rernain splintered, but it seems that if they decide to merge 
again it will be very for the DPP to regain the political ascendant. The election results of 
March 2000 confirm that the largest chu& of poütical space in Taiwan is stiil held by consewatives 
(whether the KMT or KMT LLdefectors'~. We have yet to see whether consewatives will hold this 
space united or divided. 
The Effect of Economic Liberalizaîion on Taiwan's Political Space: 
I would l i e  to use the last part of this section to summzinze the effect economic liberalization 
has had on Taiwan's political space since 1986-87. Cectainly economic Iiberalization alone cannot 
account for the ongoing success of consematives in Taiwanese politics. In my view, however, the 
fact that the KMT has derived political benefits from economic liberalization has not been sufficiently 
highlighted in the curcent literature. The m s t  salient politicai aspect of economic liberalization in 
Taiwan is its absence from public debates, even if economic concems were clearly present among the 
public. Throughout the 1990s economic Iiberalization was not a cause of major controversy during 
successive electoral campaigns. Thus, the political role of economic liberaiization in the 1990s was 
implicit rather than explicit. M i e  on one hand economic growth helped create the class of 
Taiwanese that pushed for democratization and supported the DPP, on the other hand it appears chat 
Taiwan's economic success was generally recognized as an achievernent of the W. Taiwan's 
economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s was well managed, gradual, and had less socio- 
economic impact than in other countries (it did not bring about severe social polarization). These 
developments aüowed the KMT to take credit for economic prosperity and to largely "neutralize" 
economic issues durhg successive electoral campaigns. 
At the same tirne, the changes brought about by economic Liberalization allowed the KMT to 
play the "stability" c d .  the middle class viewed the DIT as a safe economic manager, especiaüy in 
One strong card the KMT d l  holds is its wcaith, wiih assets consewatively estimated at US $4 biiiion (Baum 
and Biers 2000:20). 
light of the perceived need to increase Taiwan's competitiveness and maintain fiscal and monetary 
discipline. The DPP's more expansive economic policies were Iess attractive to the middle class. 
Throughout the elections of the 19905, the KMT drew relatively more support from state employees, 
farmers, housewives and retirees (Rigger 1999 137). These are some of the social classes that most 
acutely suffer from economic instability and who consequently value political and economic stability 
highiy. Specifically, the KMT's continuing hold on the sizeable rural vote was a severe handicap for 
the DPP (Copper 1998: 147). The KMT's claims to be a steady economic manager resonated with 
those groups. Thus, the KMT has been able to use the economic issue to its advantage in two ways: it 
has taken credit for economic successes and at the same time it benefits from the change caused by 
economic liberalization by presenting itself as the party of stability. 
In contrast to developments in South Korea, the effects of econornic liberaiization did not 
play an explicit, prominent role in Taiwan's electoral campaigns of the 1990s. Other issues (ethnic 
divisions between mainlanders and native Taiwanese, the threat from China, corruption, etc.) played a 
seemingly more prominent role in the eyes of voters. Notwithstanding this environment, did 
economic liberaiization expand or contract the political space available to the KMT in democratizing 
Taiwan? It appears that the process of economic liberalization did not open up any "political space" 
for the DPP or other reformist forces. The electorate recognized the KMT as a superior economic 
manager, and in the face of new challenges presented by liberaiiziltion the KMT's image as a "steady 
band" worked to its advantage. 
The DPP' s attacks on the W, though, seldom involved the use of economic liberalization 
issues. On one hand, rapid economic gmwth increased the economic power of new social eiites, 
which "served as a counter-balance to the vested interests of the KMT . . . " (Ravich 2000: 130). 
Large sections of these new eiites suppocted chauge and the DPP. in spite of t h ,  it was very difficult 
to criticize the KM' on its economic record. The KMT was widely regardeci as a comptent 
economic manager. In fact, the new challenges Taiwau faced in an age of economic globalization 
made the DPP's "socialistic" policies appear rather risky. Thus, the process of economic 
liberalization was one of the factors that helped safeguard the politicai space available to the KMT. 
Liberalization helped sastain economic growth, which could only benefit the mling party; in addition, 
the uncertainty brought about by economic change made the proven economic managers, the M, 
seem more appeaiing. 
The KMT bas always been quick to take credit for Taiwan's cemarkable economic growth, 
Nationalists have consisiently pointed out that economic growih can only be maintained under a 
stable politicai environment - which the KMT aione can guarantee (Copper 1998: 149). This type of 
argument has considerable political appeal for the Taiwanese middle class that emerged in the two 
decades prior to dernocratization. At the same time, this middle class' new prominence greatly 
minimized the potential for polarization and confrontation within Taiwanese society (Cheng and Lin 
1999: 25 1). According to Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (1997)' democratization under 
economic prosperity can give the niling elite leverage and political confidence, while at the same time 
moderating the stance of opposition groups. This general observation accurately describes Taiwan's 
experience. 
Marketization preceded democracy in Taiwan by about one decade; it taught the values of 
choice and cornpetition that were later applied to politics (Ravich 2m 96). Compared to South 
Korea's democratization pmess, Taiwan's experience has been more diffuse (as the pressures for 
transformation had a mucb broader base within the general population) and less dramatic (Ravich 
2000: 97). This is attributable in part to the fact that economic growth created a large middle class in 
Taiwan but not a large working class. In other words, the fniits of prosperity were distributed 
equitably. In addition, as a broad-based political Party, the K M '  was often able to respond to societal 
impulses (Korean miiitary ders ,  on the other band, wece less subtie in their deahgs with the public). 
The large middle class that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s is, to a large extent, the child of the 
KMT' s economic management (even though some of this class' sectors have been most active in 
demanding demacratization). In my view, the class chat in Taiwan articulateci most effectively 
popuiar demand for democrarization is the same class that wili ensiite the continued viability of 
M - t y p e  policies and values. The KMT buiit "a winning majority on a rare combination of 
flexibility and rigidity and a unique blend of symbols and pay-offs" (Chu 1999a: 94). in rny opinion. 
this flexibility is perhaps the key quality that has ailowed the KMT to politically exploit the new 
economic ciimate brought about by Liberalization. In this regard, the DPP's ideological rigidity may 
be a iiability. 
2.4. Alternative Exrilanations of Conservathe Predomjnance 
This section will analyze four possible alternative explanations of conservative political 
dominance in Taiwan's recent history. The four explanations are: h t ,  Taiwan's general economic 
prosperity and equitable wealth distribution; second, Taiwan's precarious national security status; 
third, the W s  organizationai expertise and extensive resources; and fourth, social culture as a 
pillar of conservative mle. (While these four factors, aione or combined, cannot provide a complete 
account of domestic political dynamics in Taiwan, they do provide interesting insights into recent 
poütical developments there. Nevertheless, 1 believe a comprehensive study of Taiwan's political 
space today must take into account the process of economic liberalization and its effects) 
in my view, the equitable weaith distribution and economic growth achieved by Taiwan since 
the 1960s is in great masure responsible for the KMT's ongoing political dominance. The 
anainment of high growth levels and fair income distribution occurred under the KMT's auspices. 
Voters have credited the KMT with sound economic management and have rewarded the ruling party 
with ongoing political support. Sirnply put, the KMT, as the long-time ruling party, bas long been 
associated with Taiwan's spectacular economic successes. Not only did its economic policies secure 
strong economic growth, but they also secured the equitable distribution of new wealth. Arguably, 
the K M T ' s  conscious poiicy of encouraging the growth of d and medium enterprises (to avoid 
possible political challenges from big conglomerates) has been partly responsibte for the absence of 
gross income inequdities. 
1 believe that economic growth and quitable wealth distribution alone are not suffident to 
explain the ongoing political dominance of the KMT. Since democratizaiion, the economy has 
remained a prime concem for voten. To a large extent, the public has continued to vote "through its 
pocket." However, simply stating that continuing economic growth is the reason the KMT has 
mainiained its political dominance is too simplistic an assertion. Economic growtb has, indeed, 
continued. However, since the mid-1980s the nature of Taiwan's economy has been changing, and so 
bas the nature of its growth. Not only has the nature of Taiwan's economic growth chan@, but also 
there are some indications that income gaps are widening and growth is slowing. in sum, 1 believe it 
is only partially correct to state, "Economic growth has ensured the KMT's political dominance," 
Such an argument overlwks the changes that have taken place within Taiwan's econorny in the last 
fifteen years, narnely, increasing economic liberalization. An analysis of the political role of 
economic liberalization is essential to understanding the W s  political performance in the 1990s. 
The ongoing threat from China might also be viewed as a possible explanation for the 
Nationalists ongoing political dominance in Taiwan. Sorne scholars have argued that a majority of 
voters view the KMT as the party best suited to cope with the threat from Mainland China (Cheng 
and Lin 1999: 250-25 1). On one hand, the KMT, as a "one-China'' Party, has been able to counter- 
balance risky "separatist" forces. On the other hand, it is a historically anti-communist party that has 
been able to co-opt large segments of the native Taiwanese elites; this can endear it to votew who 
value Taiwan's own identity and oppose communist China (Cheng and Lin 1999: 251). in addition, 
the KMT has been seen as having the expertise and organizational capacity necessary to unify Taiwan 
in the face of extemal threat. Analysts have argued that China's threatening stances in the t99û5 
helped perpetuate the KMT's dominance longer than might have been natural. For instance, Chinese 
threats in 1996 were credited with motivating votes to support President Lee in largec numbers than 
expected, so that he was able to pass the 50% mark in the first direct ptesidential elections (be ended 
up with 54%). Gallup polis conducted in the fail of 1995 indicated that 61% of respondents qproved 
of the sram quo with China, which indicates strong support for h i d e n t  Lee Tung-bui's "China 
policy" ( L a i i i  1997: 33). 
While it is not possible to deny tite salience of the national security issue in domestic 
Taiwanese politics, this factor alone has not been the one to ensure ongoing ICMT success. The 
drama attached to China's threats during election campaigus in Taiwan naturally seems to 
overshadow other issues at stake. However, we must not lose sight of two facts: first, in the mincis of 
Taiwan's electors the economy has remained at least as important an issue as national secuxity; 
second, the nature and "quantity" of Chinese threats has varied considerably between 1987 and 2000. 
In other words, just because national secwity is the most "visible" and dnunatic issue at stake during 
electoral campaigns does not necessarily mean it is the most important, The "lever' of Chinese 
aggressiveness appeared to increase most during the presidentiai campaigns of 1996 and 2000, while 
decreasing somewhat in between remaining at a d e r  low levei before 1995. However, the KMT 
performed well throughout the 1990s and conservarive presidential candidates combined obtained 
about 60% of the vote in 2000 (as noted eariier). Ln other words. while threat levels varied 
considerably, the KMT' s political space varied Little. The national security issue may have given the 
KMT the "edge" in one or two electoral campaigns, but it alone cannot explain the KMT's effective 
retention of considerable politicai space. 
A fucther possible reason given for the Nationiilists' ongoing politicai dominance is the 
KMT's organizational superiority. The KMT is a Leninist-type party organized around an autocratic 
leadership, experienced cadres, a large membership base, and huge financial mets. In spite of the 
authocitarian nature of its d e ,  the KMT always remained in touch with social sentiment and gained 
experience in electioneecing thcough local elections in the 1960s and 1970s. in addition, the KMT, as 
a party, owns vast ceai estate propeaies and investments, from which it was able to draw endless 
tesoutces to fight its electoral battles. No other Party in Taiwan has enjoyed the KMT's amount of 
cesources or political expertise. The DPP, until recently the main opposition Party, was just founded 
in 1986, and has nowhere near the organization or resources of the Nationalists. In mm, it has been 
argued that the KMT retained its dominance over Taiwanese politics because it was a weii-oiled and 
efficient politicai machine. Acwrding to Yun-ban Chu, "me KiklTl builds a winning majorif.. on a 
rare combiiation of flexibility and rigidity and a unique blend of symbols and payoffs" (Chu 1999a: 
94). Its long-time domination of state institutions, its resources, and its expertise have allowed the 
KMT to continue shaping the parameters of public poiicy debates (Ibid.). 
Again, the KMT's organizationai capacity alone cannot explain its abiiity to retain a 
considerable chunk of Taiwan's domestic political space. It is undeniable that the KMT has enjoyed 
huge logisticai advantages over its rivals, especiaily at the beginning of the dernocratization process. 
However, to andyze the role played by the organizationai abilities of parties in Taiwan, it is 
necessary to be aware of the following development: while the gap in logistical capabilities between 
the KMT and the DPP has continued to close (CO the benefit of the DPP), the electoral gap between 
the twu has stabilized (to the benefit of the KMT). In other words, even though the DPP continued to 
increase its logistical capacities throughout the 1990s, its vote-share stagnated after 1993-94. On the 
other hand, while the KMT's relative logistical superiority continued to decline, it maintaineci control 
of its traditional poiitical space. This seems to indicate that organizational superiority alone cannot 
tell the whole story of the KMT' s politicai performance in the 1990s. 
It has also been argued that Chinese culture and Confucian values have played a role in 
preserving the KMT's dominance within Taiwanese politics (Copper 1998: 147). Chinese cultural 
values are oftea characterized as promoting deference to authority and sustaining a conservative 
political culture. From this perspective it is posited that Confucian values imbued into members of a 
politicai community from a very early age encourage individuais to revere authority figures such as 
parents, eiders, or political leaders. Questioning authority is discouraged. By implication, this type 
of attitude is supposed to benefit politicai incumbents, as those under their p le are less Likely to 
challenge their authority. 1 beiieve, however, that Taiwan's cecent politicai experiences pmve that 
Chinese culture and Confucian values are not at a i i  incompatible with democracy. The resistaace to 
authoritarian mie during the 1970s and 1980s and the high level of citizen involvement since 
democratizatioa show that the Taiwanese people are no less ready to "question anthority" than 
c i k a s  of estabtished democracies. To claim tbat the KMT has remained the choice ofnumerous 
voters due to culturai conditioning seems to imply that the Taiwanese public is unwiliing to judge for 
itself the performance of its political leaders; 1 disagree with this implication. Chinese culture is no 
more or less suited to democtacy than other cultures. 
2.5. 
Let us conclude this chapter by examining the broader significance of Taiwan's experience. 
in a 1992 article discussing the possibility that the proposed North Amencan Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) might aid politicai liberalization in Mexico, Peter Smith (1992: 7) offered Taiwan as an 
example of a country that had liberaiized its economy but not its politics. Since 1992 Taiwan has 
continued to liberalize its political institutions and its economy, but in a free and competitive political 
environment conservatives appear to have retained theu share of political space. This allows the case 
study of Taiwan to yield five general lessons relevant to the study of the political effect of economic 
liberalization: fitst, ongoing economic liberalization c m  actually buttress the position of conservative 
politicai forces; second, the middle classes appear as a basically conservative political force; third, the 
change and uncertainty wrought by ecanomic refonn c m  often help conservatives in the struggle for 
political space; fourth, tiberalization may in fact benefit the social elements that support conservative 
rule; and fifth, the nature of the effect liberalization has on the political space rnay Vary according to 
the way liberalization is implemented. 
Political coaservatism: 
Taiwan's ment  experience is especiaiiy important because it shows that economic 
liberalization does not necessarily provoke social changes that undermine established political 
institutions. In fact, economic refonn cm help conservative forces maintain their electoral appeal. 
The KMT did experience a sbarp diminishiug of its politicd space right after Martial Law was lifted 
in 1987. It appears, though, th& this decline is in large measure attributable to the fact that after 1987 
the political arena m Taiwan was open to lree conipetition, and the KMT no longer enjoyed the 
privilege of king "the only garne in tom." M e r  1993-94 an apparent "point of equilibrium" waç 
reached, through wbich the KMT would hold a diminished but stable political lead over the DPP. 
Thus throughwt the 1990s the KMT, through free and fair electoral competition, was able to maintain 
its political hegemony by persuasive, not coercive means. This development took place at a time 
when Taiwan was beginning to feel the effects of economic liberalization and domestic market 
opening. interestingly, the recovery of the KMT's political fortunes, after 1993, took place precisely 
when the effects of economic liberalization came to be increasingly felt by the Taiwanese public. 
The Middle Classes: 
A second general lesson we might draw from the Taiwanese expenence pertains to the 
political behaviour of the middle c~asses.'~ Modernization theory postulates that economic 
development can change the politicai make-up of societies by giving rise to "modem" social groups, 
such as the middle class, which will demand politicai reform. However, developments in Taiwan 
seem to show that the largest portion of the middle class actually stayed faithful to the KMT. 
According to a study by Chang Mau-kuei (1993), the "new" middle class (composed of professional, 
technical, and managerial workers, plus govemment employees) is likely to support the KMT, while 
small business owners and the working class are more sympathetic to the DPP (cited in Cheng 1993: 
153-154). While Taiwan's middle class has supported democratization, a majonty of this very same 
class has continued to support the KMT as weU -the middle class might be labelled "pro-reform" and 
"pro-Kh4l"' (Cheng 1993: 154). "As long as its capacity to make credible policy commitments is not 
hampered, new social groups are more likely to look to the incumbent elite rather than the opposition 
for solutions" (Chu 1999a: 86-87). As Yun-han Chu (1999b: 197) points out, fuahermore, 
underlying Taiwan's economy is a very 'Yuid class structure." This very fluidity has dowed 
conservative political coalitions (the KMT) to prevent opposition groups from making inroads with 
'O Recent surveys in Taiwan re v d  that M y  54.7% of respondenu perceive themselves as '?nidde class!' 9.3% 
see ibemselves as 'ûpper-middle class," while 26.896 think thcy belong to the "lower-middle class" (Cheng and 
Lin 1998: 229). 
specific social sectors with a distinctive set of socio-economic programs. Economic liberalization 
may have accentuated the fluidity of Taiwan's socid saucnue and thus helped Taiwanese 
conservarives retains predominance over this country's political space. The middle class is often 
viewed as a reforming force within transitional dernocracies, but îhe case of Taiwan cails this 
assertion into cpestion. On one hand, economic liberalization may provide the middle classes with 
increased opportunities; on the other hand, the middle classes may expect sustained regdation and 
spending h m  the govemment in order to maintain social welfare programs (Chang 1993: 155-156). 
UncertPinty: 
The t h i i  lesson to e x m t  from ment developments in Taiwan is that conservative political 
gcoups can exploit the climate of uncertainty brought about by economic change for theu own ends. 
This is iilusîrated by the KMT's successful use of its reputation as a competent economic manager, 
and by the support the KMT continues to receive from state employees, housewives, retirees, and 
rural inhabitants (Rigger 1999: 141). It is apparent that economic liberalization genetally brings some 
degree of dislocation when it is initially introduced in rnost countries. Naturally, this dislocation 
often m t e s  severe feelings of apprehension within wide sections of the public. Taiwan's experience 
shows that, in the electotate's rnind, esiablished political parties are often credited with greater ability 
than an inexperienced opposition to manage the economy through changing times. in Taiwan, state 
employees and nual dwellers siand to lwse the msf h m  privatization and increased foreign 
cornpetition. SchoIar Sheu Jia-you (1989) calcukted that in the early 1990s 335% of the middle 
cfass worked in the public sector (cited in Chang 1W3: 133). The continuhg support of fazmen and 
state employees for the KMT indicates îhat both groups prefer the KMT's moderation and experience 
to the DPPs novel propods (perhaps Ùonidy, as the KMT initiated economic Liberalization). 
Fanners, like state employees, have a lot to lose h m  economic Liberalization and have 
continued to support the W. In 1995 10.6% of the workfocce was engaged in s o m  type of 
agricultutai activity (McBeath 1998: 190). Perbaps due to the fact that the KMT cuntrols farmer's 
associations and supports farming intemts, agriculture in Taiwan has remained highly protected: as 
of 1997-98, the average tariff on unpoaed agricultural products was 21% (for industriai products, the 
average was 7%) (McBeath 1998: 190-191). Som one hundred foreign agricultural products are 
banned h m  Taiwan's domestic market, and Taiwanese agriculture is st i l i  not costefficient (Ibid.). 
Gerald McBeath (1998) has stated that fimers have organid themselves effectively into political 
lobbies. The liberaiization of the fanning sector has taken place in areas where Taiwan has few 
producers. Rice, chicken or porlr producers have cemained liugeiy protected by the government, 
which, for instance, has had to purchase surplus tice from local fanners (McBeath 1998: 19 1). By 
protecting agriculniral interests in an era of rapid libedzation, the KhîT can count on the ongoing 
political support of fannets in Taiwan. This shows chat consewatives can often "have their cake and 
eat it": they can liberalize and at the same time exploit the uncertainty provoked by liberalization. 
The Benetidades of Economte Likdizatioa: 
At the same time, a further lesson we can extract h m  ihis case snidy is that economic reform 
often strengthens the social grwps tbat îraditionally support conservative rule. In Taiwan 
privatizaiion and economic reform have largely benefited big business and the new rniddle classes, 
traditional piUars of KMT d e .  It may be tnie that intemationaiization creates new opportunities and 
new social dynamics chat reformers cm exploit; yet Taiwan's experience apparently proves that 
conservative social groups like big business and the rniddle classes are best equipped to take 
advantage of new opportunities. One g d  example of this is the expansion of the PX Store System, 
which was able to take advantage of newly Liberalized business niles (Chang 1993: 155). Politicdy, 
the economic strengtheniog of big business and the middle classes relative to other social groups can 
only benefit conservative politicai elements. 
Tbe Wg Eeowmic Liberaüzation is Implemenkck 
The finai general lesson provided by this case study is the fact thar the political effects of 
intemationalizaiion may depend on the way in which economic iiiralization is implemented. 
Taiwan opened its financial and indusirial markets in sepuence, having established a sound industrial 
base first (Cotton 2000: 153). At the time it began to implement markeispening policies, Taiwan 
had a low foreign debt, huge foreign reserves, and a high savings rate (Chu 1999b: 184). This 
prevented any major economic dislocation frorn occuning during the liberalization process, and may 
have been what saved Taiwan h m  the 1997 Asian fiaancial crisis. The incumbent party in Taiwan 
benefited politically from rhe effective sequencing of economic refomi measures. This seems to 
imply that any evaiuation of the politicai effect of economic liberalization must closely take into 
account the way in which libedization is carried out. 
CHAPTER THREE: TBE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH KOREA) 
Economic liberalization in South Korea was initiaied in the early 1980s. As in Taiwan, the 
de-regulation of Korea's economy ran paraiiel to the "de-regulation" of political Me. As in Taiwan, 
consemative politicai leaders and parties have been able to main their dominance over the domestic 
political space (see Figure 3). Reformist elements have even k e n  unable to take political advantage 
of the socio-economic dislocation caused by the 1997 financial crisis. As Tables 7 and 8 show.' 
conservative candidates have continued to dominate the electoral aspect of South Korea's political 
space. Moreover, they have largeiy continued to shape policy and ideological debates on such socio- 
economic issues as labour and student movernents, South Korean consematives are associated with 
the interests of big business conglomerates, anti-organized labour policies, and a "hawkish stance on 
national security, as well as traditional cultural values. in contrast, refonners such as Kim Dae-jung 
are generally identified with pro-labour union stances (and student activists), anti-conglomerate 
positions, and more conciiiatory policy toward North Korea. Two episodes are highly symbolic in 
this context: first, the middle class' right-wing turn in 1991, when it refused to participate in that 
year's large anti-government protests around the country; and second, the fact that in order to becorne 
politically competitive Kim has had to alter his policy stances and move them closer to the paradigms 
set by South Korean conservatism. South Korea's experience provides added weight to the argument 
that economic liberalization need not lead to a realignment of political space in favour of reformers. 
- Figure 3, as weU as Tables 7 and 8 around here - 
The Japanese occupation of Korea en&d in August 1945, when Japan surrendered to the 
' As is notecl in Table 8.1 did not classify Kim Young Sam as a consetvative candidate in the 1987 and 1988 
elections. Ead 1 done so, the conservative vote share would have increased to 72.7% and 73.496, respectiveiy. 
in such a case, the a n d  of consecvative electonl performance in Korea would have paralleled that of 
Taiwanese consewative forces: we would see a graduai decline in conservative vote share cight after 
demmtization and a subsequent stabiization of electoml positions with consetvatives still dorninatiy 
Figure 3: South Korea's Economic Liberalization and Political Dynamics 
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TABLE 8: SEAT  DISTRIBUTION^ FOLLOWING SOUTH KOREA'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, 1988-2000 
1 1 1 
Roh Tae Woo 41.8% N/A NIA N/A I 
1 I 1 
Kim Dae-jung 23.4% 1 32.4% 26.4% 1 42.1 % 1 
1 1 1 1 
CONSERVATIVE TOTAL 1 53.5% 1 60.1%~ 1 63.1 % 54.9% 1 
Kim Young Sam 1 Lee Hoi chang2 
Kim Jong Pi l l  Park Tae Joon 
Souicea: 
a) Oh, John Kiechiang (la99: 11 1,116) 
b) Ahn, Chung-si and Jaung Hoon (1999.147) 




1, % of total seats in AssemMy. 
2. In 1QW) Kim Young Sam's Reunitication Democratk Party and Kim Jong Pil's New Democratic Republican Party merged with President Roh's 
Democratic Justice Party to tom ihe Democratk Liberai Party (DLP). The DLP was renamed the New Korea Party in 1995. In 1997, Lee Hoi 
Chang was eîected leader of the New Korea Party, which was renamed Grand National Party. 
3. Kim Jong Pil and his supporters were part of the ruling Dernocratic Liberal Party between 1990 and 1995. 
4. The UnHication National Party, created by Chung Ju Young, lounder of Oie Hyundai chaebol, obtained 10.7% of the seats in the National 







allies and World War II was officially ended in the Pacific. As part of the ceasefire agreements, 
United States troops would temporarily accupy the southem half of Korea (up to the 38th Parailel) 
while Soviet troops would occupy the northern balf of the Kocean peninsula. Both these forces were 
to maintain order and ensure the orderly repatriation of Japanese troops, pending the convocation of 
free elections throughout Kocea. However, the Soviets quickly gave Korean communists, under the 
leadership of Kim ii-sung, control of the northern bdf of Korea. Kim modeled North Korea after the 
Stalinist regime and created a toialitarian dictatorship. in the South, the Americans supported the bid 
for political power of Syngman Rhee (1875-1%5), a nationalist-conservative politician who had lived 
in exile in the United States. Rhee counted on the support of landed elites, Korean Chcistims, and 
former members of the old Japanese colonid bureauccacy (Nam 1989: 2-3). In 1950 Kim lî-sung 
ordered the invasion of South Korea in order to re-unify the peninsula. A bloody civil war raged for 
three years. An armistice was finally signed in 1953, though tension between the two Koreas has 
remained high ever since. 
Syngrnan Rhee was fmaily overthrown by a combination of student protests and social unrest 
in 1960. He had mled South Korea with an Uon fist, intimidating political opponents and rigging 
elections. South Korea's economy was in a very difficult simation in the 1950s. Aid from the United 
States was vital to support a minimum of economic activity. In 1961, the South Korean armed forces, 
led by Major Geneml Park Chung Hee, staged a military coup and acquired supceme political power. 
According to military leaders, the coup was necessary to rid the state of conupt politicians, to uni@ 
the nation, and to strengthen South Korea in the face of North Korea's threats. Park held supreme 
power in Korea between 1961 and 1979, wben be was assassinated. While his regime oversaw and 
guided South Korea's tcansfotmation from a Third World country into an economic powerhouse, 
Park's d e  was politicaüy oppressive. Tbe feared Korean Centrai intelligence Agency (KCIA) 
hounded political opponents throughout Park's tenuce. in addition, regionalist tensions continued to 
surface throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Kyongsang proMnce in the Southeast, Park's home 
region, was apparently more favoured with gowrnment support than the Southwest (Gills 1996: 260). 
Park, however, was able to claim a measure of popular support thanks to his skilfûl economic 
management and the constant threat posed by North Korea, which caused many South Koreans to 
place their faith in their own "strongrnan." 
After sorne toying with import-substitution economic policies, in the mid-1960s the Park 
regime decided to pursue exportdriven economic growth for South Korea. The govemment 
encouraged the formation of large industrial conglomerates, the chaebol, in the 1960s, which were to 
spearhead South Korea's economic recovery (Gills 1996: 260). Park's economic planners would 
draw-up overall economic goals for the South Korean economy and would identify certain market 
sectors favourable to the participation of new fim. Particular chaebol were then assigned 
appropriate market sectors according to govemment criteria with overall national economic goals in 
mind. The Korean govemment's level of intervention in industriai development was thus extcemely 
high: the state would set long-tenn economic goals and at the same time determine the different 
corporations' area of action. South Korea's industrial production, manufacturing, and exports in 
general grew at an astonishing rate. In the 1970s large sectors of South Korea's population began to 
share in the increase of weaith. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the South Korean govemment 
essentially followed a statist approach to economic development while leaving limited room to 
private initiative, yet respecting private property and private economic transactions. Nevertheless, 
capital rnovements were severely restcicted, high taciffs for imports and other protectionist measures 
stayed in place, and the govemment retained a large proportion of bank property shares. 
South Korea's economic development gave cise to a new middle class that was politically 
conscious and wiiing to claim politicai cights. This new middle classes, educated and critical of the 
govenunent's political tactics, easily becarne a force for refonn in South Korea's politicai life. 
Economic growth aiso strengthened the fabric of civil society, making it more independent and 
complex. Xt would becorne m c h  more difficult for authoritarian govemments to manipulate a 
prosperous and confident society. On the other hand, the economic p w t h  that commenced under 
Presideat Park's tenure seemed to lend considerable moral legitimacy to an authontacian regime able 
to manage the nation's economy effectively and achieve a high level of coordination among the main 
economic actors. In addition, some sectors of the new middle classes were alarmed by the radical 
proposais of certain leaders of the opposition. Park and his successor General Chun Doo Hwan could 
count on the support of the sections of the middle class that felt comfortable with traditionaiist social 
values and who did not wish to jeopardize South Korea's recent economic gains. 
Democracy finally came to South Korea in 1987, when the govemment agreed to hold direct 
presidential elections. The Chun regime made this concession after much foot-dragging. 
Negotiations on constitutional reform between the govemment and opposition groups had been going 
on since the mid-1980s. However, on April13, 1987, Chun twk the "grave" decision of suspending 
debate on constitutional refonn; as excuses, Chun gave the divisions within the opposition and the 
need for stabiiity at the tirne of the 1988 Seoul Sumrner Olympics. The presidentiai elections 
scheduled for 1987 would be held under the old d e s  of indirect democracy (Han and Chung 1999: 
21 1). A stonn of protests and massive Street dernonstrations greeted President Chun's announcement. 
In order to avoid king discredited and to take the political initiative, Roh Tae Woo, a former generai 
and the current presjdential nominee of the ~ l i n g  Democratic Justice Party, endorsed the proposal of 
holding direct presidential elections. He also cailed for constitutional changes and politicai amnesty 
for opposition figures (Han and Chung 1999: 212): President Chun reluctantly acquiesced to his 
nominee's proposais. Direct presidential elections were held on December 16, 1987. The ruling 
party's candidate, Roh, won the election with a plurality of the vote (36.6%). 
The ongoing implementation of market-opening poiicies in South Korea ran parallel to the 
dernocratization process. Thanks to economic growth and the rise of the prîvate sector, the South 
Kocean state's control over society was curtaiied. In tuni, the rise of South Korea's pro-democracy 
Roh may have calleci for the restocation of Kim Dae-jung's political nghts in 1987 in order to ensure the 
opposition would not field a single presidentiai candidate in the 1987 election (Oh 1999: 99). As it turned-out, 
Roh's gambIe paid-off, since Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young Sam split the anti-government vote. 
movement was intimately iinked to the social changes brought about by economic development. This 
section will look at some of the main steps taken toward economic tiberalization and review the 
overall impact of marlret-oriented reforms. Despite the new prosperity acquired by Koreans over the 
past twenty or thùty years, market-opening re fom have sparlred considerable socio-economic 
change within South Korean society, not al1 of it pleasant for the public (for general economic 
indicators, see Table 9). 
- Table 9 around here - 
Liberalizing Meosuros Up To lm: 
As mentioned above, while Park Chung Hee's regime promoted export-led growth, it retained 
tight control over large sectors of the economy and took an active role in economic planning. Park's 
govemments maintaineci key protectionist masures in place and pncticed monetary and fiscal 
regulation. The existence of high levels of govemment regulation began to change under the Chun 
Doo Hwan regime (1980-1988). As South Korea's economy grew and became more complex, "the 
private sector and other social p u p s  became more vocal about the negative aspects of the state- 
centred developrnental policy: these criticisrns produced pressures for more liberalization" (Ahn and 
Jaung 1999: 142). The Chun govemment shifted to a policy of economic liberalization in the early 
1980s' in part due to the gcowing influence of neo-libed ideas among economic planners in the 
developing wodd (Han and Chung 1999: 208-209). The Chun govemment was convinced that the 
difficulties experienced by the heavy industrial sector around 1980 couid have been avoided had Free 
market forces been stronger (Han and Chung 1999: 209). in addition, by the early 1980s increased 
consumption in South Korea had led to a serious deterioration of the current account balance, which 
threatened South Korea's creditwoahuiess; the govemment hoped that neo-liberai "stabilization" 
poiicies would help reduce the size of cunent account deticits (ML). "Many policy makers also held 
the belief that restaring price staôiity would help restore Korea's rapid growth, improving its 
international competitiveness by breaking the price-wage spiral and inducing private savings" (Ibid.). 
TABLE 9: MAJOR INDlCATORS OF SOUTH KOREA'S ECONOMY, 1987-1997 
1 1 1 1 I 
Gross National Produd (UW million) 1 133,400 1 179.800 1 292.000 1 330,800 452,600 1 437,400 I 
1 1 1 1 1 
Total Exports (US$ million) 1 472.8 1 623.7 1 718.7 1 822.3 1 1.250.5 1 1,361.6 1 
Total Imports (US$ million) 1 41,019.8 1 61,464.8 1 81,524.9 1 83,800.1 1 135,118.9 1 144,616.2 
ExportdGNP Ratio (36) 
I I I t I I 
Foreign lnvestmntin K o m  (US) mlllion) 1 1,063.3 1 1,090.3 1 1,396 1 1,044.3 1 1.941.4 1 6,971 1 
Net Foreign Asiets (BHllon Won) 1 -1,605 1 9,104 1 8,075 1 17,539 1 22,600 1 20,332 1 
35.4% 
Sources: 
a) National Statlsticai Oflice, RepuMk of Korea (1 998: 1 1-1 2, 15,345-346) 
b) Llm, Yang Taek (2000: 20,23) 
28.3% 
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The main beneficiary of Chun nediberal reforms was the South Korean middle class (Tm 2000: 25). 
After 1981, the Chun regime teduced tariffs and export-subsidies, made efforts to dismaatle 
traàe barriers, and promoted financiai iikralizarion. Several measutes were implemented in order to 
attain price stability. Fiscai and monetary policy was tightened, real estate speculation was banned, 
wage increases were restricted (as labour union activity was suppressed), and price support programs 
for agciculturai commodities were reduced. "In some years, the govemment did not hesitate to freeze 
national budgets if there were signs of inflationary pressures" (Han and Chung 1999: 209). Lending 
regulations for banks were relaxed (e.g., credit rates were ailowed to fluctuate according to clients' 
credit ratings) and non-bank financid institutions were gradually admitted into the domestic market 
(Ravich 2000: 82). However, progress in the efforts to liberalize South Korea's economy was slow: 
there was constant conflict between efforts to liberalize the economy and efforts to stabilize it 
(through wage restraints, credit controis, or pcice regulation for properties, ail of which increased the 
level of govemment intervention in the economy) (Han and Chung 1999: 209). According to Jua and 
Kim, the "market opening was not a policy choice for Korea. Rather, it was dictated by global trends 
of liberalization and multilateral negotiation . . . " (1999: 258). This view implies that trade 
iiberalization in South Korea was undertaken as a reactive masure in response to worldwide 
economic developments. This argument appears reasonable in view of the strength of protectionist 
forces (the chaebol, the agiculturai and mnnufacturing sectors, etc.) and the high level of nationalist 
feeling in South Korea. In spite of considerable opposition to economic de-regdation within Kocea, 
efforts to iiberalize this country's trade relations have borne fmit. In 1980,68.6% of al1 impocts were 
subject to automatic approval; in 1990, the proportion had cisen to 96.3%. In tum, the average tariff 
on imports decreased from 24.9% in 1980 to 7.9% in 1994 (Iua and Kim 1999: 259). 
Liberalizing Measuns Since 19û7: 
The liberaüzation of South Korea's fmamcial markets and capital movernents dvanced at a 
slower rate than trade Iikralization. Three of the key reasons for the delay in implementing financial 
de-regdation were the fear of interest rate increases, successive govemments' desire to retain the 
political levetage provided by financial controls, and the large number of bad loans in existence. 
Nevertheless, some measures to liberalize financial markets were enacted before the 1997 fmancial 
cnsis. and more measures followed after (in part due to international pressure). In June 1993, 
President Kim Young Sam's govemment unveiled its five-year econornic plan, which bighlighted 
"refonns," "de-regulation," and "intemationalization." The govemment hoped to "align" the Korean 
economy with "growing liberalization" and "globalization trends" (Oh 1999: 137). This pian also 
provided for the liberalization of capital markets and secunties businesses. South Korea became a 
member of the Organization for Economic Cwperation and Development (OECD) in 1996. This step 
"provided a significant momentum for financial refonn and capital account liberalization in Korea" 
(Jua and Kim 1999: 258). in 1994, South Korea began to abide by the World Trade Organization's 
(WTO's) d e s ,  which "obliged Korea to adopt import-export liberalization and freôtrade policies" 
(Oh 1999: 194). interestingiy, on December 9, 1993, President Kim Young Sam "apologized" to the 
public "for his failure to stop the opening of the rice market to foreign imports contrary to his election 
pledge" (Oh 1999: 220). 
The level of foreign direct investment into the South Korean economy has also incread 
considerably in the last ten years. in 1993, FDI increased by 16.8% compared to the previous year; in 
the first half of 1997 it was projected to increase by 252% (Jua and Kim 1999: 260). In the wake of 
South Korea's 1997 financial crisis, the conditions attached to the International Monetary Fund's 
bailsut package included fiirther capital market iiberalization requirements. Efforts have also been 
made recently by the Korean govemment to liberalize the labour market, providing for more flexible 
hours and teducing obstacles to lay-offs (Han and Chung 1999: 222). From Han and Chung's 
perspective, the most pressing challenge for South Korea's economy in the 1990s was the 
deterioration in its ternis of trade. The import prices of raw materials (e-g., oil) increased, wNe the 
won appreciated by 11% against the yen between July 1995 and the end of 1996; the expoa sectors of 
pettochemicals, setni-conductors, and steel were the hardest hit. The high costs of input factors (sach 
as capital, labour, reaî estate, and logistics) and low relative productivity were at the mot of South 
Korea's economic problems. These structural deficiencies were compounded by the weak fuiancial 
structure of major business groups like Hanbo, Sammi, or Kia (Han and Chung 1999: 220-221). 
The exogenous causes of Korea's declining tenns of trade and competitiveness clearly 
constrained the cboices available to South Korean economic policy makers. An expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policy would increase the cunent account deficit and the won's value, as well as cause 
inflation to rise; import restrictions would provoke reprisais from trading partners and prevent the 
competitive restructuring of Korean corporations. South Korea's economic managers have opted for 
a policy of stability hoping that the cumnt account deficit will decrease as the economy becomes 
more competitive. The govemment cut its 1997 budget by 2 trillion won and kept up a non- 
expansionary rnonetary policy - inflation was held down at 44% (Han and Chung 1999: 22 1-222). 
The capital market refonn of 1998 eliminated restrictions on foreign ownership of local stocks, 
foreign direct investment, and foreign borrowing by private companies (Park 2000: 64-65). 'To 
increase cornpetition in the banking sector, in December 1997 the General Banking Act was revised 
to allow foreign banks to establish bank subsidiaries in Korea" (Country Econornic Review 1999: 15). 
However, Swth Korea's record on structural reform is at best rnixed. For instance, the govemment 
continues to bail out insolvent banks, which then bail out insolvent chaebol (Bong 1999: 440). 
Socid3conomic Results of Economic Liberalization: 
While the international enviconment and the need to increase Korea's economic 
competitiveness may encourage economic liberalization, it is still not clear whether the South Korean 
economy has developed built-in defences against the instability that economic Liberalization has 
provoked. 'The govemment's disincentive for deregdation could ache either fiom its rent-seeking 
motivation or h m  the lack of confidence in the market mechanism and resulting fear of market 
failure" ( h a  and Kim 1999: 262). In addition, the sectors of the economy that would suffer fmm 
liberalhion are resisting M e r  moves in that direction (Ibid.). "Given the monopolistic stnicnire 
of the domestic market in Korea, the producers' cost of trade liberaikation - Le., reduced profit 
ma@ - may well be substantiated" (Jua and Kim 1999: 255256). Demratization has allowed 
economic policy to be greatly influenceci by politicai considerations that focus narrowly on the 
interests of theu own constituents (Kwon 1999: 293). Key social groups feel insecure under the new 
(iiberal) economic conditions. For instance, in Februaq 1989,20,000 f m r s  demonstrated in front 
of the National Assembly demanding the abolition of the irrigation tax and govemment purchase of 
excess agricultural products (Han and Chung 1999: 2 17). 
However, economic and financial de-regulation left a regulatory "vacuum" in South Korea: 
market self-regulation was not yet in place when govemment regulation was removed (Yom 1999). 
This "vacuum" helped bring about the financial crash of 1997. Other scholars have suggested that 
economic liberalization has actuaily increased the market share of the big conglomerates, the chaebol 
(Suh 1998: 57-58), which have generaliy financed conservative politicians. South Korea began the 
punuit of a liberai foreign economic polic y in the mid- l98Os, somewhat later than Taiwan (Haggard 
1995: 138-9). in South Korea's case, liberalization has clearly bmught about negative side effects. 
This section provides an analysis of the doînestic politicai dynamics in South Korea since 
1987 and the politicai impact economic liberalization has had on South Korea's political space. On 
one hand, the infrastructure of Korean political parties is iraditionally unstable. "ûf the four major 
parties that competed in the first founding election of the Sixth Republic in 1987, not one has kept its 
initial name nor maiotained its original organizational structure" (Shin 1999: 179-180). This 
instability makes it difficuit for parties to buiki broad bases of popular loydty and support. On the 
oiher hand, ail major political parties are organized in a markedly hierarchical manner that allows 
bosses to manipulate the parQ machinery at wiU. According to S b ,  "[ajll Korean policicd parries 
are ideologically conservative 'cadm' parties; thq have failed to recruit active members from among 
the masses and offer no ideologicaliy aitemative pobcies or pmgrams of poticy action" (lm 179- 
180). AhD and Jaung add: "Korean politics has becoine increasingly contentious and confrontational 
as induscrialkation has developed, but the cleavage between workea and ernployers cannot easily be 
uanalated uito p ~ y  cnOin  because of legal c o n k t s  [on the ability of organized labour to 
intervene directly in Party politics]" (1W: 146). These constraints and the determination of existing 
parties to discourage the formation of new parties allows status quo political parties to maintain theii 
dominance of the politicai scene @id.). Strong regionalist sentiment among the public and the iiigh 
level of pcotagonism of individual political leaders are other reasons for which Korean political 
parties are not "institutionalized" (Ahn and Jaung 1999: 148). "A rubber-stamp legislahue, an 
imperial president, a presidential power cult, a politics of 'pushing thmuph' instead of persuasion and 
compromise, and artxcial reshuffling of parties after elections are familiar phenornena in Korea" 
(Ahn and Jaung 1999: 145). Presidents in South Korea stiîl view political parties as insîmments to be 
used arbitrarily (GuiIlenno O'DonnelI called such behaviour "delegative democracy" in the context 
of Latin Amrican politics) (Ibid.). 
Politid S m  1987-lm 
While the momentws events of 1987 had seen a ternporary alliance of the middle classes 
with worken and sîudents to overthrow the Chun DIJo Hwan regime, the following years saw the 
middle classes "retreating" ta more conservative stances. President Roh Tae Woo and conservative 
political elemnts were able to c w p t  the middle classes by portraying the political crisis of 1987- 
1991 as a bo-hyuk (conservative-radicd) conflict (Potter 1997: 232). The rniddle classes, at the 
governrnent's instigation, began to fear the mstability brought by increased strikes and the possible 
loss of economic competitiveness provoked by p w i n g  wages (Han and Chung 1999: 216217). 
Undet denwirracy, o r g a n i d  labour uni011 açtivity became more effective, and, as Table 10 shows, 
the Roh Tae Woo years (1988-1993) saw a notable increase in the numberof srrikes in the transport, 
hospital and mines sectors (Ibid.). The decrease in political repression aad more effective union 
action enabled worlrers' salaries to grow cmsiderably. For instance, between 1987 and 1990, wages 
inmaseci 23% more than productivity (Han and Chung 1999: 218). By 1990-1991, it became cleac 
that the middle class no longer supported the aims of labour union and student activists. This 
"divorce" between the middle classes, on one hand, and students and labour unions, on the other, 
represented the fmt conservative political success under a democratic system. While the middle class 
supported the democratization of political institutions in 1987, it subsequently came to favour 
"refonns within stability" (Oh 1999: 116). On Januacy 22,1990, the Reunification Dernocratic Party 
(RDP), led by Kim Young Sam, and the New Democratic Republican Party (NDP), led by Kim Song 
Pil, merged with the niSig conservative Democratic Justice Party (DJP) to form the Democratic 
Liberai Party (DLP). ''The DJP had originally been formed as an institutionai framework CO buttress 
the nile of Chun Doo Hwan and his power group" (Ahn and Jaung 1999: 148). The new DLP would 
contra1 217 of the 299 seats in the National Assembly (Oh 1999: 1 16). 
Conservatives' ability to c w p t  a moderate Lie Kim Young Sam, a long-cime prdemocmcy 
fighter, provided conservatives, at Ieast in the short-tenn, with a firm g ip  over South Korea's 
domestic political space. The conservative tendencies of the middle class wece c o n f m d  in 1991. In 
ApriVMay of that year demonstrations attended by about 200,000 workers and students took place in 
87 cities after the beating death of a student by the police on April25. Contrary to what happened in 
1987, the middle classes and whitecollar workers wece absent from these protests (Oh 1999: 115).~ 
The New York Times reported that the middle class was "fed-up" with the radicaiism of students and 
labour unions (Ibid.). (For an illustration of the level of labour untest in Korea, see Table 10.) In 
December 1992, Kim Young Sam won the presidential election with a respectable 42% of the vote. 
He campaigned on a platfom of relative moderation and conservatism, promising an end to 
corruption and more equitable economic policies. Kim Dae-jung, his main rival, suffered at the p l l s  
due to his "radical" image. He advocated "social-dernocratic" measures, such as protection of the 
South Korean rice market and price controls (Bedeski 1994: 54). He also advocated anns control, 
The Korean labour union movement itseifwas divided between those who wanted to collaborate with 
opposition parties and h s e  who tùought workers should pmue an "independent class sûategy" (Cho 1998: 
241). 
ceunification, rurning the Demiütarized Zone into a tourist area, and reducing the rniiitary service to 
eighteen mooths (dom from twenty-four) @id.). Kim Dae-jung's vulnerability lay in his image as a 
dical ,  a supporter of student unrest and left-wing labour agitation; his plitical enemies even 
accused him of having contacts with Nortb Korean spies (Shim 1992: 17). Kim Young Sam stood for 
stabiiity and refonn "within the system" (Shim 1992: 18). His approval catings shoctly after his 
inauguration surpassed 80% (Oh 1999: 133):' 
- Table 10 around here - 
During the electoral campaign for the April 1 1, 19% National Assembly Elections, "[the] 
mling party darkly foresaw political confusion and chaos, should the opposition p u p s  win in the 
Assembly elections on the heels of the opposition victory in the local government elections. 'Which 
do you chwse? Siabiliry or confusion? I expect you to make the right choice,' Resident Kim declared 
at his party's national convention" (Oh 1999: 181). He stated that if the opposition won, no new 
reforms would be enacted. During this electoral campaign, "Kim Dae-jung, once champion of the 
downîrodden, now consciously stnick a cenaist - even a pro-business - stance as he tried to tone 
d o m  his image as a firebrand Iiberal to appeal to a wide segment of voters at the centre and the nght. 
[On his part] Kim Jong Pi1 rook pride in king 'the mie conservative' whom the followers of 
authoritarian leaders of the militarydominated republics should support" (Oh 1999: 197). 
Conservaticive forces gained a majority of the vote. "In pst-vote interviews many [voters] related that 
they had cast their bailots in favour of those Iegislators who wodd support stability, the ruling party's 
c q a i g n  theme" (Oh 1999: 19 1). The election resuIts caused the marginaüzation of labour interests 
the National Assembly (in addition, the government and mass media began to blame high wages as 
the culprit of the declining competitiveness of South Korea's export sector) (Oh 1999: 197): 
Kùn Young Sam used bis popuiarity to enact some useN n f m  hat wuid consolidate democracy finthet. 
For example, he disùanded Ifie clique wiihin the officer corps that had supported military d e  in the p s t  and 
ensured the promotion of younger officen. 
*ln March 1997, the mling party was able to mise existiag labour laws in ordet to, amoog oiher things, allow 
maisages to move workecs fiom non-strüre sites to teplace saikimg workers. In addition, management would no 
longer be obligeai to pay strilang employees (Oh 1999: 205). 
TABLE 10: LABOUR DISPUTES IN SOUTH KOREA, 1987-1995 
Source: 
Kim, Byung-Kwk and Hyun-Chin Lim (2000: 113) 
1 987 
Note: 
1 .ln thousands 
2. After 1991 the level of strike activii diopped dramatically. This was in part due to activists' 










Political Space, 1997-hnt: 
Recent elections have not seen a noticeable weakening of conservative politicai coalitions in 
South Korea. in spite of President Kim Young Sam's unpopularity in 1997 (due especiaiiy to 
revelations of financiai scandals involving his son), conservative presidential candidates did well in 
the 1997 election. That year, Kim Dae-jung, a long-tim opponent of authoritarian rule, was elected 
president with 40% of the popular vote. The two main conseNative candidates, Lee Hoi Chang and 
Rhee In-je, won 56% of the popular vote. "if Rhee had not split the ruling camp, Lee would probabiy 
have been ihe winnet' (Oh 1999: 23 1). Kim Dae-jung's victory also owed a lot to his alliance with 
the conservative United Liberai Demrats (ULD) of Kim Jong Pil, which nominated him as its 
candidate. Thanks to the ULD' s endorsement, Kim obtained a sizeable number of votes from 
Chungchong province where he had ken unsuccessful in the past (Oh 1999: 231). Thw, in spite of 
the social trauma caused by the 1997 financial collapse, a considerable rnajority of South Korean 
voters placed its trust in conservative candidates. Moreover, Kim made a serious effort to portray 
himself as a moderate and attract middle class voters. ïrnmediately d e r  the election, he selected Kim 
Jong Pi1 as his prime minister. Kim Jong Pi1 had S e ~ e d  successive military governments in various 
capaciiies; atone point he personally ordered the KCiA to assassinrite Kim Dae-jung (Shim 1999). 
The insecurity created by the 1997 financial may have actually helped conservative politicians play 
on the public's fears for political purposes. Thus, it appears that conservative political forces have 
teraineci control of a large portion of the political space in spite (or because of) economic change. 
Kim Dae-jung's political position today appears tather strong, especially after his initiative to 
met with North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Pil, in Pyongyaug. Kim Dae-jung has been srriving since 
1998 to project a d e r a t e  image, shedhg his supposed "radicalism." His govemment has forged 
aùead with economic refom (albeit with mixed ~sults) and the South Korean economy has been 
steadily hpcoviag. On the other band, the president's Party, the Millennium Democratic Party lost 
By December 1996, only 17.7% of ihose poUed in a suniey beiieieved Kim Young Sam was doing a "fine job" 
as president (Oh 1499: 209). 
the May 2000 National Assembly elections to tbe conservative Grand National Party (GNP), which 
won a pluraiity of the votes cast with 39%. The GNP obtaiaed 133 seats in the legislature, four seats 
shy of a majority (Shim 2000.13). The second iargest conservative Party, the ULD, obtained 9.8% of 
the vote. It seems that President Kim will able to muster a thin majority in the Assembly thanks to 
his "marriage of convenience" with the ULD, whose current leader, Lee Han Dong, was recently 
n a d  prime minister by Kim (Lee 2000a: 15). The president's alliance with the ULD will allow him 
to retain some capacity to manoeuvre within the political scene. 
While Kim Dae-jung's position today appears secure enough, the reformist political forces on 
which he depends have not achieved a fundamenial re-alignment of South Korea's political space. 
What is more, the conservative GNP and its leader, Lee Hoi Chang, are gaining mornentum. Lee, a 
65-year old former Supreme Court Judge, opposes the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the 
sale of troubled industries, like Daewoo, to foreign buyers. In an interview with Far Eastern 
Economic Revitw, Lee stated the following in regards to govemment economic policy: "If necessary, 
the govemment should inject public fun& quickly and at an early stage while pursuing bold 
resuucturing to normalize the situation" (Far Eastern Economic Review 2000: 22). While he does not 
oppose President Kim's "Sunshine" policy toward North Korea, Lee insists the North must respond 
by opening-up (Shim 2000: 13). Lee Hoi Chang would be in a very strong position should he decide 
to seek his party's nomination to run for president again in 2002? Thus, in spite of the socio- 
economic fluctuations brought about by economic refonn in Korea, the political breakthrough Korean 
refotmers might have hoped for has not occurred up to this point. 
The Eiîect of Economic Liberaiization on South Korea's Political Space: 
This section ends by briefly sammariPngthe ways in which economic Liraüzation may 
bave affected South Korea's politid space. Economic Iiberaiization and democratization had three 
7 Lee Hoi Chaog, it must be painted out, is politieally handicapped by the fact his two sons avoided compulsocy 
military service. This revelation caused a stir during the 1997 presideniial election. 
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principal results for the South Korean state. Fit, the authority of the state was eroded. as it was no 
longer "insulated" from society. Second, economic policy became less consistent in many areas, as 
democratic administrations were forced to pander to their constituencies and supporters. By making 
the state more vuinerable to pressure groups, democratization limited the state's abiiity to respond 
quickly to changing situations (Ahn and Jaung 1999: 160-162). Thus, by implication democratization 
and economic liberalization both weakened the coercive power of conservative coalitions in South 
Korea. 
in spite of the loss of politicai controI by conservative political elements, evidence seems to 
indicate that their electoral and ideological appeal among Korean voters has not diminished. In my 
opinion, the political impact of economic liberalization is one of the reasons conservative parties have 
been able to protect their political space. On one hand, liberalization has had the effect of benefiting 
the "naturai" supporters of consetvative @es, such as the chuebol and the middle classes. On the 
other hand, conservative politicians can use the negative effects of economic liberalization (financiai 
instability, industriai problems, worsening labour relations, etc.) to play up the need for "siability" 
and "security." These arguments can resonate with large sectors of the voting public. There have 
ken complaints that President Kim Dae-jung's market-opening masures have mostly benefited 
foreigners and have increased the incorne gap in Korea (French 2000: A13). The middle class lent its 
active suppott to reformist elemnts during the smiggle for democratization in 1987. "[However], 
when dernocratization moves in the economic sector - specificdy, the unbridled freedom to strike 
and consequent wage hikes - seemed to threaten economic growth and stability, as well as social 
order in 1991, the middle class seemed to switch its support to the consetvative forces in government, 
political parties and management" (Oh 1999: 1 15). The middle class felt threatened by post- 
democratization demands for econornic equality and thus resisted measutes promoting economic 
equality. 
Whiie the socio-political effécts ofeconomic growth were already salient in the late 1970s, 
attempts to restoce a democratic reg- after Park's murder in 1979 failed. Four key facts aided the 
miiitary in its suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 1980. First, the power of and collusion 
among the military and bureaucratie establishments remained intact after Park Chung Hee's death in 
1979. Second, the main opposition figures and political parties remained divided. Third, the middle 
class' feared the instability democratization migbt bring. 'The 'middle class' had grown during the 
Park regime and acquired a vested interest in sociwconomic stability and continuity. It was still too 
insecure about its political and economic status to opt decisively for political freedom and democracy 
at the risk of sacrificing the country's continued economic growth and its own newly secured socio- 
economic status" (Han and Chung 1999: 205-206). The final reason was the officer corps' 
cohesiveness and its inherent belief in its right to intervene in politics to "protect" Society (Han and 
Chung 1999: 205-207). 
Between the 1960s and the early 1990s, both the armed forces and the chaebol were the most 
powerful institutions in South Korea's politicai life. With the consolidation of democracy and the end 
of direct military intervention in the nation's political life, the political power of the chuebof 
increased (Oh 1999: 210). The withdrawai of one of its "cornpetitors" from the race for political 
space automatically increased the relative political importance of the chaebol. Democratization and 
open poiitical cornpetition provided the chuebol with mw oppomnities to control politicians. The 
large conglornerates were also able to take dvantage of de-regulation rneasures in order to increase 
their control of the dornestic market (Oh 1999: 21 1). "When the economy turns dom, Koreans are 
more eager thaa ever that the chuebol prospet" (Clifford 1998: 341). Economic liberalization has 
increased the chuebol's market share (Suh 1998: 57-58). In fact, it is quite possible that the chaebol 
wül c w p t  the middle class in its fight against organized labour (Ravich 2000: 92). M e r  the 1996 
elections for the National AssembIy, "ut] was widely felt that the mling Party, with its close coilusion 
with the chaebol, which did not spare any money to assure a consewative majority in the Assembly, 
clearly violated the spirit and letter of the 1994 reform Iaws that dealt with fair and clean elections 
and campaign spending" (Oh 1999: 194). In lare 19% the ruling DLP and the Korea Employers' 
Federation coliuded to pass anti-labour bills in the Assembly (Oh 1999: 202-203): 
3.4. Alternative Exslaoations of Conservaîive Predominance 
Economic iiiraiization alone cannot provide a complete picture of recent developments 
within South Korea's political space. Various aitemative explanations have k e n  proposed as reasons 
for ongoing consewative predorninance over South Korean politics. This section will comment on 
four: first, regiondist sentiment among the Korean public (which often leads voters to choose leaders 
based on their provincial origin); second, South Korea's precarious national security situation (and 
voters' consequent dislike of any political trends that might resemble comrnunism or socialism); 
third, generai economic growth tfiroughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s (under consewative 
management); and fourth, the influence of traditional Korean culture and Confucian values. 
Perhaps paradoxically, democratization has brought an increase in regiondism, an old 
"bugaboo" of Korean politics (Ahn and Iaung 1W9: 152). Regional loyalties have continued to play 
a key role in the outcome of al1 three presidential elections that have taken place since 1987 (Han and 
Chung 1999: 214). In the presidential elections of 1987, 1992, and 1997, the vast majority of voters 
in Kyongsang province (Southeast) voted for tIie candidate of the niling party (a Kyongsang native in 
the first two elections). At the same tim, the vast majority of voters from Cholla province 
(Southwest) voted for Kim Dae-jung (a Cholla native) in those three elections. It is difficult to 
exaggerate the amount of influence regionalist feeling bas on South Korean politics. The fact that 
consewative candidates often hail from the populous Southeast region has helped their political 
fortunes considerably. Already in the 1960s and 1970s critics accused President Park offavouring 
Kyongsang with government invesmient fimds and building projects, while ignoring Cholla's needs. 
While in the p s t  regional inequalities conld be blamed on the whims of an autocratie dictator, today 
dernocracy has laid bare and reveaIed to ali the &ph of regionai i l s i t i e s  among ordinary Korean 
The power of the chuebol was weakened after ihe 1997 Asian Economic Crisis. 
1 do not deny that regionalism in South Korea is perhaps the single biggest factor in 
sustaining consenative political hegemony. The fax that Kim Dae-jung, the principal opposition 
leader before 1997, is from the Swthwest region automatically means that large portions of the 
Southeast public distmst him. Nevertheless, the "regionalism factor" must be supplemented by other 
Factors to provide a complete picture of recent Korean domestic political dynamics. I believe one of 
these "other factors" is economic liberaiization. The trends that the intemationalization of the South 
Korean economy has set in motion have often tended to strengthen the political appeal of 
conservatives in the countryside and among the middle classes. A pure regionalist perspective would 
be hard-ptessed to explain the strong, ongoing appeal of conservative parties and leaders among the 
Korean middle classes and rural inhabitants. In my view, these sectors of the population see 
consenatives as the best representatives of their interests in an era of globalization. in addition, 
regionalism alone cannot explain current political dynamics in Seoul, where about 25% of South 
Korea's population lives. The strong regionalist sentiment present among the public in Cholla and 
Kyongsang is somewhat diluted in Seoul. Kim Dae-jung has traditionally been very popular among 
the masses of the capital. However, conservative leaders have continued to successfully apped to 
Seoul's middle classes for support. Thus, while regionalism can explain a lot in South Korean 
politics, it must be combined with other explanations to provide a complete picture. 
The security threat that North Korea still poses to the South is another possible explanation 
for the ongoing conservative hegemony within South Korea's political space, North Korean stiU lives 
under a nithkss Stalinist regime that has not hesitated to blackmail the international comrnunity to 
achieve its ends. In 1994 North Koreaatuacted international attention with its threats to build nuclear 
warheads. Jn 1996 North Korea sent commandos across the border on a sabotaging mission, In 1998, 
clashes between the navies of the two Koreas occnrred at sea. At the 1996 National Assembly 
elections, considerable sections of the public admitted to supporting the niling party because of its 
bard-line stance toward North Korea (Oh 1999: 191-192). The South Korean people are by-and-large 
strongly anti-communist (notwithstanding radicals who hold an idealized vision of the North). 
Remote association with communist of soçialist ideas can stiil taint politicians in the eye of the 
public. Conservatives may have benefited considerably h m  their "hawkish" stances on national 
security issues. 
It must be pointed out, though, that South Kotea's position today vis-à-vis the North is much 
stronger than it used to be, for example, in the 1970s. This state of affaics has been brought about by 
the South's vibrant economic and social development over the past two or three deçades (Han and 
Chung 1999: 2 16). Under Park Chung Hee's rule, fear of a massive communist invasion was real 
enough, and South Koreans felt themselves to be in a very vulnerable position. South Korea may srill 
be vulnerable to missile attacks or sabotage by the North. Today, however, the main fear among 
South Koreans is not that the North will invade and conquer, but that its communist regime will 
suddenly collapse, leaving a huge humanitacian crisis in its wake. isolated incidentican still rattle the 
South's public at particular junctures, but on the whole the military threat level from the North seems 
io have decreased considerably. A tough stance on security affairs might win conservative politicians 
some "extra" votes on election tirne, but it cannot account for conservatives' solid politicai position at 
any given time (regardless of whether the North provokes an incident or noi). 
Another alternative explanation of conservative hegemony within South Korea's political 
space is the view that general economic growth has ensured conservatives' ongoing predominance. 
My objections to this argument are similar to the ones 1 expressed in regards to the same argument in 
the context of Taiwan's experience. It does seem correct to state that throughout the 1980s President 
Chun Dw Hwan's regime was able to gain at least the acquiescence of large sectors of the rniddle 
class co his dictatorial mle thanks to the economy's spectacular growth in that decade. ûverdl 
economic growth and the generai improvement of the middle class' lifestyle under politicaliy 
conservative economic management created a strong bond between the middle class and political 
conservatism. President Roh Tae Ww and Kim Young Sam benefited from this bond. Until the 
1997 fînancial crisis conservatives were able to take political credit for South Korea's e-conomic 
growth and equitable wealth distribution. This p w t h  endeared them especially to the new middle 
classes that were grateful for their newfouad prosperity. 
However, as in the case of Taiwan, any discussion of the political effects of economic 
growth must take into consideration the fact that economic Liberaiization has mn parallel to economic 
growth since the mid-1980s. The process of liberalization has been an important cornponent of South 
Korea's recent economic policy, and any analysis of the impact of economic growth should also 
consider the role played by economic liberaiization. A viewpoint that sirnply asserted that economic 
gcowth has propped up conservative hegemony in South Korea would overlwk the fact that widening 
income gaps and regdatory vacuums have accompanied ment economic growth. In other words, the 
type of economic growth today is diffetent frorn the type of economic growth of 1987, yet 
conservative political hegemony has continued. The structure of the Korean econorny today is 
diierent h m  its structure ten or tifteen years ago, yet the d e - u p  of South Korea's political space 
is remarkably similar. 1 believe it is important to ask what d e  structural changes in the economy 
played in perpetuating conservative predominance over the political space. 
The fourth alternative explanation of ongoing conservative predominance in South Korean 
politics is "culture." It has been argued chat traditional Korean culture and Confician values 
emphasize respect for authority and deference CO those superior in a hierarchical scale. In theory, 
these social rules sustain a conservative political culture that values obedience and respect for the 
state and its leaders. By implication, this type of political culture in Korea has helped conservatives 
maintain their political advantage even after democratization twk place. My objections to this kind 
of argument as a complete explanation of political dynmics in South Korea are similar to my 
objections to the same argument in the case of Taiwan. The level of (sometimes heroic) resistance to 
authoritarian nile in the 1980s and the level of citizen participation in political life since 1986-87 
show that Korean society is as suited to democracy as any other society, culturaily speaking. In spite 
of the fact that South Koreans lived under doritarian mie for long periods of tirne, demoçracy was 
always held up as a noble ideal tbat ought to be pursued. Military mle was genedy  considered an 
anomaiy, which even the dictators tned ta j e  through various means. 
Due to the transitional nature of its demoçracy and the fact that its economy bas undergone 
extensive reform, South Korea is a usehl case through which to study the political effect of market- 
oriented reform. This case study's experience is particularly interesting because the political space 
held by conservative political groups does not seem to have been reduced by the process of economic 
liberalization. The case study of South Korea provides the same lessons relevant to the stuùy of tbe 
politicai effect of economic liberalization as Taiwan: first, market-opening reform can actually help 
the political fortunes of consemative forces; second, the sense of uncertainty promoted by economic 
reform can often be exploited by conservative forces; third, the middle class appears as a basically 
conservative social group; fourth, the changes wrought by liberalization may in fact benefit the 
supporters of conservative mle; and fifth, in spite of the fact that liberaiization brought about serious 
economic trauma, this not only did not hurt mling elements, but may have actually helped them in the 
long-nui. While these general lessons are essentially the same as those extracted from the case of 
Taiwan, the South Korean case provides its own set of nuances to these assertions. 
Economic Liberalization and Conservaüsm: 
The first general lesson provided by South Korea's politicai development is that economic 
liberalization need not hurt political conservatism. In fact, conservatives can exploit the state of €lux 
created by market-opening reform for politicai purposes. Over the past two decades, the Korean 
economy has changed considerably, yet South Korea's political space has not. Economic reform does 
not seem to have provided political refomrs with the chance to expand their political space. Rather, 
conservatives have k e n  able to take advantage of the changes wrought by economic liberalization. 
At the very least, conservatives have been able to exploit new social conditions to deny refomrs a 
politicai breakthrough. South Korea's institutional structure may have changed, but the political 
preferences of the population have not. Economic liberaiization may indeed open-up political spaces, 
but South Korea's experience calls into question the assertion that tefocmers usually are the ones to 
occupy these new political spaces. Kim Chae-Han has distinguished between "stability-seeking" 
voters, who vote for the current government despite (or because of) economic decline, and 
"reitospective" voters, who are l i l y  to vote against the govemment in times of economic difficulties 
(1999: 60). 
Economic inequaiities have increased, especiaiiy since 1997: As the middle class faced 
early retiremnts, layoffs and wage reductions, the wealthy have taken advantage of the crisis by 
investing in Liquid assets and benefiting from hi& interest rates (Lee 1999: 124). "Korea's rapid 
entry into an open global economy is exacerbating the gap between the rich and the poor rather than 
promoting a more even distribution of economic benefits" (Joong Ang Ibo 1999: 145). While the 
middle classes benefited €rom liberalization in the 1980s and early 1990s, they have suffered from the 
side effects of liberalization since 1996-97. Middle class income dropped by 11.8% in 1998 (Lee 
1999: 124).1° While 68.5% of households in 1997 considered themselves part of the middle class, 
only 65.7% did in 1998 (JwngAng Ibo 1999: 144). The rural sector has also been negatively 
affected by economic change. In 1990, the agricultural sector still employed one out of every five 
South Koreans (Kim 2000a: 75). It is possible for conservative politicians to continue CO-opting these 
two social groups by taking credit for economic growth and offecing lirnited protection from the 
negative side effects of liberalization. In addition, iraditional institutional supporters of conservatisrn 
such as the chuebol can take advantage of economic change to increase their dominance of the 
economy further. For example, Korean conglomrates have been busy buying shares in state-owned 
firms that are about to be privatized (Lee 2m 41). Developments in South Korea contradict the 
assertion that intemationaiization increases the opportunities available for reformers to expand their 
political space. 
Since tbe 1997 financial crisis, the proportion of the population classificd as "extrernely poor" rose h m  3% to 
6.896, while the number of people eligible for weLfare assistance rose h m  1.48 million to 1.74 million. About 
140,000 households previously classüïed as "middle class" feu into the "low-income" level after the crisis (Lee 
1999: 121). 
'O The average monihly incorne of middle class workers dropped fiom 193 million won in 1997 to 1.73 million 
in 1998 (Jwnghg ïlbo 1999: 144). 
The Middle Classes: 
A further lesson that can be extracted ftom this case study is the observation that the middle 
class is an essentially conservative, not reformist, political force (for an illustration of South Korea's 
class stratification, see Table 11). It is m e  that in 1987 the middle class joined students and 
protestors in the demand for democracy. This dernand represented a desire for an institutional change 
that would allow the middle class a voice in the country's govemance. However, the middle class' 
action need not be interpreted as a desire to change the make-up of South Korea's domestic political 
space. M e r  1987 middle class voters continued to support conservative political candidates (who 
were sometimes direct successors to past military rulers). Such behaviour on the part of the rniddle 
class holds interesting implications for the debate on the political effect of economic liberalization. 
The view that internationaiization leads to political change is partly premised on the assurnption that 
economic openness and growth encourages the rniddle class to seek political change. While the 
Korean middle class did dernand institutional change in 1987, its political choices since have 
prevented a fundamental tealignment within South Korea's political space. Scholar Hagen Koo has 
called the Korean middle classes "progressive in a specific sense" (Koo 1993: 66). 
- Table 1 1 around here - 
The Beneficiaries of Economic Liberaiidon: 
South Korea's experience also shows that by benefiting social groups that support 
conservative nile, changes wrought by liberalization can actuaily help preserve conservatives' 
politicai space. In the 1980s and 1990s. economic reforms largely benefited the new middle classes. 
Newfound prosperity may weli have been one reason for which these social sectors largely continued 
to support conservative politicians while rejecting opposition policies as "rïsky." This improvement 
in the middle class' üfestyle can be associated at the same time with economic libecaiization and 
conservative mie. Moreover, it is possible that by disproportionately hurtiog the Korean w o r b g  
class, intemationalization has actually increased the relative importance of the middle class withia 
TABLE 11: DISTRIBUT1ON OF EMPLOYED PERSONS BY SOCIAL CLASS IN 
SOUTH KOREA, 1975-1995 (%) 
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1. "New Middle Classn indudes college educated professionals, cierical, and white-collar workers. 
"Old M i l e  Classn indudes entrepreneurs and self-employed wholesate and retaii traders. 
2. Preliminary data based on new occupational categories. 












society. This can only benefit potiticians supported by the middle class. Economic refoms have 
benefited other piUm of cooservatism, such as big business. For instance, reduced government 
control over the economy has increased the private sector's relative influence in society. 
Conglomerates have also been able to increase their power due to the fact that Korea's democratic 
governmenis are naturally more vulnemble to outside ptessures than dictatorial regimes (Kwon 1999: 
243). Thus by smngthening conservative social elernents, economic reform may have strenshened 
conwrvatism in general. Even thwigh conservative politicians are no longer able to coerce the middle 
class or the privaee sector, they can rely on the voluntary suppn of such groups. And the fact that 
these groups have been stcengthened by internationalization can only benefit the political positions of 
consewatives. 
Tôe Trauma d Economic Liberaiiaation: 
The last gened lesson from the Korean tesson 1 would like to comment on penains to the 
Asian Financial Crisis and subsequent political developrnents. The Korean population suffered 
serious economic trauma in 1997 and 1998. One of the causes of the financial crash is the fact that 
financial de-regdation in South Korea had not yet k e n  ceplaced by sound market resvaints of 
economic activity. The process of internationalization may thus be considerai as one of the direct 
causes of economic recession. Yet in spite of the fact th& the govemment of President Kim Young 
Sam was guilty of ïncumpetent economic management, his party's presidential candidate, Lee Hoi 
Chang, did quite well in the December 1997 elections and nearly beat Kim Dae-jung. In fact, if Rhee 
in-je had not bolted the GNP to run as an independent and split the conservative vote, Lee might welt 
have won the election (Oh 1999: 231). In spite of intemal divisions, the 1997 presidential election 
sbowed that Korean consetvatives coatroUed most of the coanüy's politicai space even after financial 
niin had hit the country. In my view, this provides some evidence to support the assertion that 
economic trauma provoked by economic change cm actuaily encourage voters to support "moderate" 
and "stable" leaders while shunning "ris y' refonners. 
CBAPTER FOUR: ANALYZING INSTITUTlONS, DRAWING IMPLICATIONS 
Thus far we have estabiished that, under certain conditions, economic libecaiization does not 
aiways open up politicai space for refonners. The experiences of Taiwan and South Korea support 
the argument that conservatives can exploit economic libecaiization in order to preserve their own 
politicai space. Chapter Four wiU address two remaining tasks of this thesis: first, we wiU outiine the 
key institutional differences between the two cases in order to acquire a more detailed understanding 
of the link between economic libecaiization and the development of politicai space in each country; 
second, we will dcaw some general conclusions from the empirical evidence presented in this thesis 
and explore some further implications of our findings. 
4.1. Institutionai "Channels" Anecdn~ the Process of Democratizadon 
nie respective experiences of Taiwan and South Korea yield a similar lesson, namely, the 
possibility that economic liberalization reinforces conservative political-spatial tendencies within a 
poiity. In spite of this broad sirnilarity, there is a stark difference between Taiwan's and Souih 
Korea's processes of economic liberalization and democratization: South Korea experienced higher 
levels of social and political conflict (e.g., labour unrest, student demonstrations, political uncertainty) 
than Taiwan did. 1 argue that these differences are at least in part a result of varying instimtional 
configurations in both the economic structures and state-society relations. 
Ecowmic Insüîuîions: 
One can identify two key differences between Taiwan and South Korea in regards to the 
effect of economïc iiberalization on political space. Fit, the structure of Taiwan's economy 
guacanteeâ greater adaptability to new economic conditions. South Korea and Taiwan started h m  
similar ligbt ~nanufacturîng bases, but restnictured diierently. Their economic paths diverged 
"because their leaders chose different policies to effect restructuring" (Shafer 1997: 115). While 
Taiwan's productive base is composed largely of srnail and medium enterprises, large industrial 
conglomerates, the chaebol, dominate South Korea's base. in addition, until the 1970s mainlander 
politiciaas dominated the KMT, while native Taiwanese dominated business life. In Taiwan the 
KMT sought to avoid potential political challenges by big business groups and so encouraged the 
formation of small and medium enterprises (Shafer 1997: 116). in Korea the state encouraged 
economic concentration through the formation of "national champions," the chaebol, in order to more 
euily manage the national economy (Ibid.). Taiwan's medium and srnall enterprises have been able 
to cope well with changing market conditions and increased foreign competition. in addition, the 
hi& savings ratios and low debt-equity d o s  of Taiwanese enterprises have allowed them to 
d n t a i n  their competitiveness in an era of economic globalization. On the other hand, the high level 
of ownership concentration in South Korea's economy has prevented a quick response by Korean 
enterprises to changing economic conditions. The chaebol have genedly preferred to face new 
challenges through further expansion and türîher bomwing, rather than engaging in painhl corporate 
restructuring. in addition, Korean conglomerates' traditional dependence on govemment assistance 
and guidance did not prepare them to face an era of freer econornic competition. 
Traditional business practices of Taiwanese and Korean fimis have determined to a large 
degree their countries' reaction to economic liberalization. The rather distant relationship between 
state and business in Taiwan has encouraged Taiwanese corporations to maintain financial discipline. 
In Korea, however, cozy state-business relations encouraged conglomerates to recklessly expand and 
bomw, in the belief that govemment would always be available to bail them out or provide loans at 
below-market interest rates. Corporate debt management in both countries provides a sharp contrast. 
Between 1988 and 1996, the average ratio of corporate leverage - debt over equity - in Taiwan was 
82%; in South Korea it was 348% (Woo-Cummings 1999: 123). 
Taiwan has largely escaped socio-economic trauma th& in large measure to the fîexibIe 
quaiîties of its economic structure. South Korea, though, has been made vuinerable to the negative 
side effects of economic liberalization by the cumbersome and rigid qualities of its economic 
institutions. W e  Taiwan's wealthiest five families control14.58 of the country's total market 
capitaiization, the five wealthiest South Korean families control29% (Woo-Cummings 1997: 129). 
Small and medium enterprises in Taiwan provide 78% of aii jobs on the island (Chu 1999b: 186). 
The character of Taiwan's economic sbucture bas discouraged the formation of a strong organized 
labour rnovement, while in South Korea labour unions have played a prominent role in political life. 
This has conûibuted to greaier polarization in South Korea's political life. 
State-Society Relations: 
The presence or absence of stable state control over the poiicy process in both countries is the 
second key difference between the two cases. This difference has played a vital role in "filtering" the 
political effects of economic liberalization. While in Taiwan the KMT retained control of the policy 
process throughout the democratization process, the political oversight of policy-making in Korea has 
been much more vague, due to the p a t e r  volatility of Korean political institutions. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s the political stability provided by the K M T s  ongoing dominance allowed 
Taiwanese policy makea to plan unencumbered by partisan considerations. Moreover, the KMT's 
ties to a variety of relevant social groups (business, rurai groups, etc.) shielded governrnent 
departments from outside pressures. In contrast, the absence of stable political parties that Korean 
democratic presidents could depend on rendered the position of South Korea's executive branch 
politicaiiy insecure. h i d e n t s  Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) and Kim Young Sam (1993-1998), unlike 
Lee Tung-hui in Taiwan, did not enjoy the support of an experienced political party with deep roots in 
South Korean society. Lzacking the "protection" of a dependable and well-connected political 
institution, Korean presidents' poücy-mahg pmcess kcame wlnerable to outside pressure. 
Moreover, executive branches that relied soleiy on the politicd capital of a single person (the 
president) lacked the politicai muscle provided by the support of a large potitical organization. In 
turn, this weakened the abi ty of the executive branch to implement needed structurai reforms. 
Thanks to the K M r s  cohesiveness, consemative mle in Taiwan appeared to be more stable 
than in Korea The absence of an established "catch-di" conservative politicai party in South Korea 
gave more fluidity to this country's political space. In some sease, the differing structures of 
authontarian rule in both countries carried over into democratic political dynamics. In Taiwan, an 
experienced political institution, the KMT, reinforced its i i i  to the middïe classes, big business and 
mral groups through its electoral appeal. The KMT's organizational excellence gave these social 
groups a concrete rallying point. in him, the KMT could feed on the ongoing support of large sectors 
of the population. In Korea, however, politics, in democracy as in dictatorship, continued to be 
personality-based. Charismatic leaders collaborated with and "divorced" each other with some 
frequency, as political parties often changed names or merged. South Korean politicai parties are 
"cadre" parties that score low on al1 dimensions of institutionalization: ideological distinctiveness, 
organizational linkages, and institutional stability (Kim 2000a: 59.60). Taiwan's Kuomintang, on the 
other hand, scores high al1 these dimensions. Consetvative social classes in South Korea could not 
look to one single political institution to represent their interests,' 
In other words, the nature of the KMT's authoticarian rule over Taiwan was very different 
from the nature of the dictatorial regirnes established by the military in South Korea. Because of its 
roots in Society, its co-opiative capability, and its electod fûnctions, a one-party regime is usually 
better informed about socio-political pressure than a military regime (Cheng and Lin 1999: 232). 
One-party regimes are also better prepared than military ones to compte electoraily with rival 
parties; they may have already imposed their control over the military (Ibid.). These assertions seem 
to hold true in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea. As an experienced politicai party with a 
' Oddly enough, some of tbe ment political trends in Taiwan and South Koreit seem to point to a reversal of 
characteristics between the two cases. The KMT reiained its dominance over Taiwanese politics up to 1999- 
2000, when a disgnintled Jantes Soong quit the party and decided to nin as an independent This example of 
"petsonaiity politics" cost the KMT its political hegemony, as it ensured the splitting of the conservative vote in 
the March 2000 presideniial ekctioas. A similar development took place in South Korea's 1997 presidentid 
campaign, when Rhee in-je split the coaservative camp by leaving rhe Grand National Party and ~llllt-ng as an 
independent. However, he GNP now seems to be consolidating itseif as Korea's main conservative party, 
especiaiiy after its victory in ihe May 2000 National Assembly elections. 
relatively clear ideological platfonn (based on Sun Yat Sen's Three Principles of the People), the 
KMT was better able than Korea's military culers to articulate a cohecent political message. 
Tbroughwt the 1960s and 1970s the KMT sponsored relatively competitive local elections in 
Taiwan, which enable its cadres to acquire experience in the organization of political carnpaigns. The 
KMT' s ideological coherence, organizational expertise, and basic stability were key in providing 
Taiwan with a stable democratic transition. Simply put, the KMT retained important i i i  to broad 
sections of Taiwanese society throughout decades of authoritarian rule. The KMT's links to a vaciety 
of constituencies provided Taiwan's ruling elites with a degree of political flexibility and levei- 
headedness. in contrast, the constituency supporting dictators in South Korea was a single and 
isolated social gtoup: the military. Between 1961 and 1987 (with a bief interruption in 1979-1980), 
two autocratie military dictators, presidents Park and Chun, niled South Korea. As the military was 
their only reliable source of power, they did not enjoy as many ties to civil society as the KMT did in 
Taiwan. The fact that their base of support within Korean society was very narcow made them more 
insecure and thecefore less flexible politically. 
Stability vs. ïnstability: 
The above noted differences between Taiwan's and South Korea's political economies caused 
the process of dernocratization to unfold in different ways. The demand for democratization in South 
Korea was much more widespread and sudden than in Taiwan where it was largely elite-led. 
Taiwan's middle classes were notas vocal as Korean middle classes in their opposition to 
authontacian nile. In addition, the absence of a middle class-working class alliance was one of the 
factors that aliowed the KMT to control the scope and Pace of the democratization process in Taiwan 
(Winckler 2000: 125). By exerting p a t e r  pressure in favour of political change, South Korea's 
middle classes created a politicaliy insecrire environment for Korean consetvative elites. Moreover, 
while South Korea's middle class fonned tempocary alliances with opposition groups to challenge the 
zuthoritarian regime, the Taiwanese middle class remained largely independeut h m  politicai 
associations with opposition groups (Hsiao and Km 1997: 321). The onset of democratization saw, 
to some extent, a d e  reversai between Taiwanese and South Korean middle classes. in Taiwan, the 
fact that the middie class did not have to face a challenge fiom the working class, due CO the latter's 
weakness, allowed the middle class to remain as a sociaily progressive force (Wiickler 2000: 125). 
On the other hand, labour militancy and ongoing social instability in South Korea immediately after 
1987 tumed the Korean middle class into a force for political stability (Winckler 2000: 125). Thus 
the d e  of the middle classes during democratization was different in each case. 
In sum, consewatives were able to retain predominance over political space in Taiwan and 
South Korea throughout the 1990s, as previously shown. In spite of the different impact ofeconomic 
libedization on both countries, politicai outcomes have been similar: conservatives in both polities 
have continued to dominate the political space. In my view, this development is closely related to the 
fact that economic liberalization generally means change. In tum, either success or failure in the face 
of change wiü lead broad sectors of the population CO seek stability. Stability is, more often chan not, 
associated with consewative political parties and leaders rather than with refomrs. The adaptability 
of Taiwan's economic structure in the face of change allowed conservatives to take credit for 
economic liberalization, characterize the opposition's policies as irresponsible, and at the same time 
serve as a "refuge" for social groups made nervous by market-opening policies. Mi l e  Korean 
conservatives have not as easily been able to take credit for modemizing South Korea's economy, 
their appeal as "guardians" of stability has k e n  magnified by their country's economic woes in the 
face of globaiization. Furthermore, economic and financial liberaiization in Taiwan tmk place in an 
orderly and weii-sequenced manner, while in South Korea liberalization bas left a considerable 
regdatory vacuum. This may be a further reason why rnarketqening measnres in Taiwan have not 
pmvoked a national trauma, as they have in South Korea. 
Drawing upon lessons extracted h m  Chapters Two and Three and Section 4. I., this section 
89 
wiii attempt to outline under wbich conditions conservative plitical forces c m  take advantage of 
economic liberalization. Economic liberaiization need not be equated with political liberaiization. 
Tnie political liberalidon would require a fundamental realignment of the political space available 
to organized political groups. Political liberalization would also require a fundamental realignment of 
social coalitions and the political p~ferences of the public. W e  market-opening refonns can alter 
the social or econoMc cleavages within a society, these alterations do not always lead to political 
change. in fact, they can, under certain conditions, lead to a reinforcement of traditional political 
cleavages. On one hand, economic reform often benefits social groups that traditionaüy support 
political consecvatism. On the other hand, economic change can provoke the kind of trauma chat 
drives key sectors of the public to seek protection for its established intetests from traditional political 
coalitions. 
It seerns difficult to deny that there is a very strong correlation between economic 
liberalization and politicd-institutional change. Economic openness generally leads to greater 
societal openness. This development tends to come into conflict with the continuing existence of 
authoritarian political Mmes, for it is very difficult to mintain coercive control over a complex and 
energetic civil society. Economic Iiberalization can also increase the confidence and autonomy of 
new social sectors such as the middle class. Moreover, market-opening reform exposes a society to 
extemai influences and broadens its political perspectives. in sum, economic liberaiization tends to 
diminish the level of control auhoritarian govemments are able to exercise over a polity. This vital 
fact generally facilitates, at the very least, the weakening of authoritarian nile. By definition, 
authoritarian tegirnes resttict direct participation in public a f f '  to small numbers of individuais. 
The weakening of authoritarian mie frequently Ieads social groups that were forcibly prevented from 
participating in public affairs to gain greater access to the political arena. The clash between the 
desire of previously marginalized groups to gain access to political levers of power (e.g., the middle 
class, which desires recognition of its newfound statu), on one haad, and authoritarian institutional 
structures, on the other band, often brings about a fundamental pliticai-institutional change. Thus 
there seems to be a clear positive relationship between economic liberalization and political- 
institutional reform, as postulated by Milner and Keohane (1996). The case studies of Taiwan and 
South Korea appear to lend support to such an assertion. 
The political-institutional reform of previously authoritarian regimes represents a 
fundamental "break from the past" because it impties that, under new institutional mies, participation 
in public life is no longer limited to a select few. Moreover, coercion is no longer the main tool used 
by the state to govem. Politicai-institutionai refonn in democratizing polities theoreticaily means that 
citizens will be able to freely support the politicai groups of their own choice. Notwithstanding the 
fact that important continuities between the old a new regirne may exist (in the bureaucracy, the 
judiciary, the armed forces, etc.), political-institutional ceform does allow wide sections of the public 
a much broader margin of action within the political sphere. This development certainly represents a 
fundamental change. However, political-institutional change cannot be equated with purely political 
change. The fact that institutions change does not necessarily mean that the politicai preferences of 
the population will change tw. 
When dealing with "change" within a polity, therefore, it is important to distinguish between 
politicai-institutionai change and politicahpariai change. The former essentidly refers to a change in 
the "niles" of competition for plitical power. Political-spatial change refers to changes in the actual 
distribution of power and, by implication, changes in alignments of political support. 1 believe the 
concept of political space is useful to analyze the level of political change within democratizing 
polities that are undergoing economic liberalization. Changes within tbe political space of a Society 
are fairly accurate measurements of the amount of overall political change taking place. M i l e  
political-institutional change and political-spatiai change are separate concepts, both are closely 
ünked. The institutional setting within which political competition takes place naturaiiy plays a key 
role in determinhg political outcornes. However, while institutions carry large political weight, îhey 
may or may not lead to politicai-spatial change. Thus, ihis diesis' main hypothesis does aot 
necessarüy contradict the assenion that market-opening reform leads to political-institutional change. 
This thesis has aimed at two valuable goals: first, to correct the possible misperception created by 
existing iiterature that economic reform brings ongoing political-institutional and political-spatial 
change, and second, to specüicaiiy address the impact of economic refonn on poiitical space, an 
concrete area which current Literature has paid littie attention to. This section will now proceed to 
articulate the necessary conditions for economic liberalization to reinforce the position of 
conservative political coalitions and aiiow them to maintain control of the political space in 
transitional democracies in spite of political-institutional refortn (see Figure 4). 
- Figure 4 around here - 
The first condition under which economic liberalization can help preserve the political space 
of conservatives is economic success (prior to iiberaiization). As liberalization often confronts an 
ambivalent population with uncertainty, conservative parties, in order to stay in power after political- 
institutional change has taken place, need to be viewed by the electoraie as safer economic managers 
than refomrs. This reputation can be acquired only if conservatives are associated with pre- 
democtatization economic success. Voters in transitional democracies that face economic change 
seem likely to place their trust in politicians that can provide steûdy leadership in unsteady times. 
Voters are more likely to continue trusting conservatives if the latter are identified in the public's 
mind with past economic advances. The fact that Taiwan and South Korea experienced spectacular 
and equitable economic growth h m  the 1960s aiiowed conservative elites in these countries to 
acquire a reputation for effective economic management. When faced with the challenges posed by 
economic liberalization, large sectors of the public in Taiwan and South Korea, especially sectors 
made prosprous by recent economic development, were ready to continue placing their trust in 
conservative parties or leaders who had pmved their cornpetence. Had the economic poiicy of 
Taiwanese and Korean authorirarian d e n  not been a success phor to political liiralization, their 
ideological successors would have not been able to paint themselves as successfd economic 
managers. In such a situation the public mi@ have been more willing to support reformist 
politicians to manage economic liberalization. 
Figure 4: Condidons Requlred for Conservathes to Bunefit from 
Economlc Ubaralizaoion 
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The second gened condition under which economic liberaiization might help sustain the 
politicai space of consecvatives is uncertainty. The voting public in transitionai democracies 
genedly faces a considerable degree of political uncertainty. The process of economic tibecalization 
can heighten that sense of uncertainty by confronting the public with chruiging economic structures. 
Internationalization and de-regulation, the two main components of economic liberalization, can 
present a population with p a t e r  economic opportunitics in the long-tem. However, in the short- 
term liberalization rneans certain economic sectors will no longer be able to count on govemrnent 
protection, as citizens will have to adjust to new economic conditions. Thus liberalization often 
creates a sense of vulnerability arnoag a citizenry confronted with sudden change. Evidence from the 
case studies anaiyzed by this thesis seems to suggest that voters in transitional democracies, in the 
face of uncertainty, iue more ready to support political forces they are familiar with rather than 
opposition groups. Broad sections of the population in Taiwan and South Korea have felt more 
cornfortable enmsting conservatives with the management of economic affairs in changing Cimes, 
notwithstanding conservatives' links to recent authoritacian nile. By their very nature, conservative 
parties and leaders seek to prevent, delay, or moderate change. The public may be attracted to these 
basic characteristics of conservatism in tirnes of social change and economic liberaiization. 
The third generai condition under which economic liberalization aids the political fortunes of 
conservative coalitions is the existence of a large social group with an ambivalent attitude toward 
economic Libecaiization. Ofien what is cailed the "middle class" fits this description. That very 
ambivalence is the issue conservatives can exploit more easily than refonners. Ct is conceivable that 
if a majority of the population desired radical economic liberaiization, it would be very difficult for 
traditional politicai forces to retain iheir political space. Under such conditions, p d e s  and leaders 
associated with traditional values and LLnon-modem" constituencies (such as farmecs) might appear 
redundant to most voters. Taiwanese and Korean conservatives, in spite of king the agents of 
economic liberaikation, have retained strong links to nid interests and other established groups. If 
the middle classes in Taiwan and South Korea decide to fuUy embrace economic übedization (which 
would entail the destruction of many vested interests), it is difficult to see how conservatives rnight 
reiain their political predominance. On the other band, a socieîy that completely rejected economic 
liberalization preferring instead autarchic economic policies would also reject conservatism in favour 
of more left-baning political forces. Conservatism would not appeal to an electorate opposed to 
economic de-regulation and intemationaiization. Thus, what suits conservatives most seems to be an 
attitude of ambivalence among the middle class toward economic liberalization. Ambivalence allows 
conservatives to implernent economic liberalization and take credit for its successes, whiie appearing 
to moderate the excesses of liberalization by retaining strong ties to social groups with vested 
interests in the "old" economy. 
A final condition that enables conservatives to politically exploit economic liberalization is 
the continued existence ofstill-notable but weakened social groups dependent on govemment 
protection. Neo-liberal economic policies generally imply painhl restmcturing for state-subsidized 
sectors of the economy. Naturally, individuals dependent for their livelihood on such sectors are 
wary of change, and thus are likely to support conservative political groups. Paradoxically, it is often 
conservatives who implement economic liberalization. in spite of this fact, conservatives are 
frequently able to retain the overwhelming support of protected socio-economic groups. In my view, 
this is due to conservatives' ability to retain tight institutional links to such groups and their natural 
identification with the status quo. in Taiwan, the KMT has been able to retain its hold over votes 
h m  farmers and the employees of public enterprises. In South Korea, conservative leaders have 
continued to appeal successfully to rural voten and receive considerable financial from the chuebol. 
If socio-economic groups dependent on public support were politically dominant, it would be difficult 
for conservatives to appeal to these groups and the middle classes at the same time. However, if 
subsidized sectors were no longer influentid at ail, an important source of conservative support would 
have disappeared. Evidence h m  Taiwan and South Korea seems to indicate that the continued 
existence of a weakened but still influentid public or protected sector is a political asset for 
coaservatism in transitional democracies, 
4.3. Conclusion 
Further research on the political impact of economic liberalization is still required. Economic 
globaiization and the ideologicai ascendancy of neo-liberalism are relatively recent phenomena. 
Further examination of the political impact of economic intemationaiization may yield relevant 
conclusions on the relationship between econornic policy and domestic politics. The further study of 
this relationship can also yield lessons on the ways in which voters and politicai parties react to 
economic change (or change in general). As economic liberalization opens a country's economy to 
extemal forces, the debate on the relationship between economic liberalization and domestic politics 
can be viewed as part of the "second image reversed" paradigm formulated by Peter Gourevitch 
(1978). This study has also led me to realize the need for funher research on the topics of 
democratization and the political rote of the middle class. The two case studies are examples of how 
democratization is often used by established elites to co-opt key social sectors. In both Taiwan and 
South Korea the middle class appears as an essentially conservative political force that does not wish 
to jeopardize its gains and is often unwilling to lend its support to reformist political elements. 
This thesis hm attempted to engage in the debate over the effect of economic libedization on 
domestic politics in transitional democracies by analyzing the impact of the former on domestic 
poiiticai space in Taiwan and South Korea. 1 have attempted to contribute a new perspective to his 
debate by showing that economic internaiionalization can sometimes buttress the position of 
conservative political elements within the poiities' poiitical space. In other words, economic reform 
does not aiways go hand-in-band with tme political change. Economic reform can often provoke 
social change, which may in tum Iead to fluctuations within a country's political space. However, 
these fluctuations do not necessady heip poiiticai refonners. In fact, they may create a fluid situation 
that conservatives, often endowed with mater resources and experience, are able to exploit in order 
to protect or expand their own poiitical space (in persuasive, not coercive, ways). Thus d u h g  
democratic transitions economic Liberaiization can provide conservatives with the means with which 
to either fight an effective rear-guard action or even counter-attack in the arena of politicai space. 
This political result is the expression of intemationaiization's social effects. Market-opening 
measures king unexpected social changes that can increase the public's sense of insecurity in regards 
to its economic prospects. This insecwity can solidify the support certain social groups lend to 
conservative politicai forces. Economic refonn can thus benefit politicai conservatism by increasing 
its electoral appeal to the middle class of parties that advocate stability in the face of changing 
economic ~ircurnstances.~ 
This thesis has addressed the political-spatial dynamics overlooked by the existing literature 
on the political effect of economic liberalization in transitional democracies. Milner and Keohane 
have posited that intemationaiization aids domestic political change by creating new policy coalitions, 
triggering economic and political crises, and undermining government control over macco-economic 
policy (Milner and Keohane 1996: 243). As has been demonstrated, economic liberalization can 
actually reinforce traditional policy coalitions. Moreover, conservative politicai coalitions may be 
able to take political advantage of economic crises. Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield have 
argued on their part that financial liberalization leads to an increase in the power of mobile uset and 
capital owners, which in tum increases the dernand for political reform (Haggard and Maxfield 1996: 
245). However, ris we have seen in the cases of Taiwan and Korea these asset and capital owners 
would rather aily with conservative politicai forces to preserve their gains. 
The politicai dynamics describeci above also carry interesting implications for the general 
concept of "second image reversed." This thesis' findings suggest that "chaos" ai an intemational or 
extemai level - in this case, intemationalhtion and general economic de-regdation - does not 
always translate into "chaos" or change at the domestic political level. In fact, the citizens of a polity 
that faces extemal change may be motivatecl by extemai "chaos" to embark on a quest for p a t e r  
intemal "stability" in order to offset the uncertainty presented by outside change. In other words, 
In my view, the coalition strengthened by economic liberaikation is aot so much between the state itML 
business as benveen consetvative political groups and conservative social sectors (including business, the 
middle clas, and rurai dwellers, among ohers), On this point 1 differ h m  Fields (1995)' who focuses on ibe 
state-business relationship in Taiwan and Korea 1 do agree with his observation that in bath countries business 
groups "have become dominant players in these new liberai seitings" (Fields 1995: 240). 
external change can sometimes acnially discourage internal change. This conclusion seems to be 
complementary to the assertion made by some international relations theorists that domestic change 
does not always lead to changes in foreign policy. 
Let me now address the applicability of this thesis' fmdings to other countries in the world. It 
is interesting to note that. within the United States' foreign policy establishment, advocates of 
increased engagement with China and Russia (and even Mexico) argue that liberaiizing the 
economies of these two countries will aid the cause of local political refonners. Such arguments 
state, for instance, that increasing the exposure of China's economy to international influences will 
strengthen democratic elements within China and weaken the Communist Party's hold over Chinese 
society. 1 believe the experience of Taiwan and South Korea casts some doubt on the validity of such 
arguments. Economic refonn in China rnay well allow Chinese civil society to flourish; at the same 
tirne, it is providing the Communist Party with a new lease on life by letting it tûke credit for 
economic success and portray itself as a bastion of stability in times of radical change. Other lessons 
extracted fiom this thesis might point to the possibitity of economic refonn leading Chinese 
Communists to liberalize certain state institutions, while maintaining their overail political appeal 
among diverse social groups. In Russia, recent developments appear to conficm that economic 
liberalization can increase the political appeal of conservatives. At the moment, conservatives such 
as President Vladimir Putin have benefited from the anxiety caused by economic change. It is 
possible that if economic reform succeeds in Russia, conservatives will be well positioned to take 
credit for this. 
Economic liberalization need not be equated with political liberalization. It is true that %ere 
is an ongoing interaction between pressures fiom internationalization and resistance by entrenched 
interests aud institutions" (Miiner and Keohane 1996: 256). However, the ability of these enmnched 
interests to use hternationalization to c w p t  bmad sectors of the population has k e n  underestirnated. 
ït may be accurate to state tbat "pre-existing institutions and coalitions seem unable indefinitely to 
resist change" in the face of major economic changes (Milner and Keohane 1996: 254). 1 believe, 
however, tbat these '"pre-exisiing cualitio~ls'' have often been able to use economic refonn in order to 
curtail political reform. Helen Milner and Robert Keohane d t e  in Internationalization and 
Domestic Politics (1996: S58) that the faIl of the Soviet Union shows how capititlism is stiü a force 
capable of desaoying established institutions. This ihesis has attempted to show that established 
institutions are able to use capitalkm in order to preserve their own political space. 
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